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_4 IOCTA  2020 Foreword
I am pleased to introduce the Internet Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2020.
The IOCTA is Europol’s flagship strategic product 
highlighting the dynamic and evolving threats from 
cybercrime. It provides a unique law enforcement-
focused assessment of emerging challenges 
and key developments in the area of cybercrime. 
We are grateful for the many contributions from 
our colleagues within European law enforcement 
community and to our partners in the private 
industry for their input to the report. Combining law 
enforcement and private sector insights allows us to 
present this comprehensive overview of the threat 
landscape. 
The data collection for the IOCTA 2020 took place 
during the lockdown implemented as a result of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the pandemic prompted 
significant change and criminal innovation in the 
area of cybercrime. Criminals devised both new 
modi operandi and adapted existing ones to exploit 
the situation, new attack vectors and new groups of 
victims. 
The analysis for the IOCTA 2020 clearly highlights 
cybercrime as a fundamental feature of the European 
crime landscape. Cybercrime remains among the 
most dynamic forms of crime encountered by law 
enforcement in the EU. While ransomware, business 
email compromise and social engineering are familiar 
cybercrime threats, their execution evolves constantly 
and makes these criminal activities more complex to 
detect and to investigate. Ransomware in particular 
remains a priority threat encountered by cyber 
investigators across the EU. The amount of online child 
sexual abuse material detected continues to increase, 
further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which 
has had serious consequences for the investigative 
capacity of law enforcement authorities.
Europol is at the forefront of law enforcement 
innovation and offers various policing solutions in 
relation to encryption, cryptocurrencies and other 
challenges. The European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) 
at Europol is the platform of choice for cybercrime 
investigators across the EU and beyond to connect, 
collaborate and communicate.
The case studies illustrating this report demonstrate 
the necessity and effectiveness of international law 
enforcement cooperation in tackling cybercrime 
as well as the vital role played by private-public 
partnerships in this area. Europol provides an ideal 
framework for these different stakeholders to come 




Executive Director of Europol
Cybercrime affects citizens, businesses and organisations across the 
EU. Europol plays a key role in countering cybercrime by working with 
our many partners in law enforcement and the private sector and by 
offering innovative solutions and effective, comprehensive support to 
investigations. I hope this analysis can inform effective responses to 
these evolving threats and make Europe safer.
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C&C Command & control
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VPN Virtual private network
VPS Virtual private server
2FA Two-factor authentication
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The threat landscape over the last year described in the 
IOCTA 2020 contains many familiar main characters. 
The starring roles in terms of priority threats went to 
the likes of social engineering, ransomware and other 
forms of malware. Several interviewees captured the 
essence of the current state of affairs of the threat 
landscape by stating: cybercrime is an evolution, not 
a revolution. As time passes, the cyber-element of 
cybercrime infiltrates nearly every area of criminal 
activity. Key elements mentioned in previous editions 
of the IOCTA that return this year merit more, 
rather than less, attention. The repetition means 
the challenge still exists and has, in many cases, 
increased, underlining the need to further strengthen 
the resilience and response to well-known threats. 
The IOCTA 2020 makes clear that the fundamentals 
of cybercrime are firmly rooted, but that does not 
mean cybercrime stands still. Its evolution becomes 
apparent on closer inspection, in the ways seasoned 
cybercriminals refine their methods and make their 
artisanship accessible to others through crime as a 
service. 
The COVID-19 crisis illustrated how criminals actively 
take advantage of society at its most vulnerable. 
Criminals tweaked existing forms of cybercrime to fit 
the pandemic narrative, abused the uncertainty of the 
situation and the public’s need for reliable information. 
Across the board from social engineering to Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and from ransomware 
to the distribution of child sexual abuse material 
(CSAM), criminals abused the crisis when the rest 
of society was trying to contain the situation. The 
opportunistic behaviour of criminals during the 
pandemic, however, should not overshadow the overall 
threat landscape. In many cases, COVID-19 caused an 
amplification of existing problems exacerbated by a 
significant increase in the number of people working 
from home. This is perhaps most noticeable in the area 
of child sexual abuse and exploitation. As in previous 
years, the amount of online CSAM detected continues 
to increase, further exacerbated by the COVID-19 
crisis, which has had serious consequences for the 
investigative capacity of law enforcement authorities. 
In addition, livestreaming of child sexual abuse 
increased and became even more popular during the 
COVID-19 crisis; a recent case shows production also 
takes place in the EU.
Data compromise once more features as a central 
aspect throughout a number of threats. Both law 
enforcement and private sector representatives 
consistently report on social engineering among 
the top threats. With regard to social engineering, in 
particular phishing, cybercriminals are now employing 
a more holistic strategy by demonstrating a high level 
of competency when exploiting tools, systems and 
vulnerabilities, assuming false identities and working 
in close cooperation with other cybercriminals. 
However, despite the trend pointing towards a growing 
sophistication of some criminals, the majority of social 
engineering and phishing attacks are successful 
due to inadequate security measures or insufficient 
awareness of users. In particular, as attacks do not 
have to be necessarily refined to be successful.
The developments in the area of non-cash payment 
fraud over the past twelve months reflect the overall 
increase in sophistication and targeting of social 
engineering and phishing. Fuelled by a wealth of readily 
available data, as well as a Cybercrime-as-a-Service 
(CaaS) community, it has become easier for criminals 
to carry out highly targeted attacks. As a result, law 
enforcement and industry continue to identify well-
established frauds as a major threat. 
Subscriber identity module (SIM) swapping is one of 
the new key trends this year, having caused significant 
losses and attracted considerable attention from 
law enforcement. As a highly targeted type of social 
engineering attack, SIM swapping can have potentially 
devastating consequences for its victims, by allowing 
criminals to bypass text message-based (SMS) two-
factor authentication (2FA) measures gaining full 
control over their victims’ sensitive accounts.
Business Email Compromise (BEC) continues to 
increase. As criminals are more carefully selecting 
their targets, they have shown a significant 
understanding of internal business processes and 
systems’ vulnerabilities. At the same time, certain 
other forms of fraud have entered the spotlight due 
to the sheer number of victims they have generated. 
Executive summary
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The spread of online investment fraud all over Europe 
is not necessarily new but has generated increased 
law enforcement attention as victims at times lose 
their life savings to professional organised criminal 
groups that have incorporated cyber elements into 
their scams. 
The clear majority of law enforcement respondents 
once again named ransomware as a top priority threat. 
Although this point has been made in past editions 
of the IOCTA, ransomware remains one of the, if not 
the, most dominant threats, especially for public and 
private organisations within as well as outside Europe. 
Considering the scale of damage that ransomware 
can inflict, victims also appear to be reluctant to come 
forward to law enforcement authorities or the public 
when they have been victimised, which makes it 
more difficult to identify and investigate such cases. 
Criminals continued making their ransomware attacks 
increasingly targeted. Ransomware has shown to 
pose a significant indirect threat to businesses and 
organisations, including in critical infrastructure, 
by targeting supply chains and third-party service 
providers. Perhaps one of the most crucial 
developments is the new way of pressuring victims 
to pay by stealing and subsequently threatening to 
auction off victims’ sensitive data. 
Besides ransomware, European law enforcement 
reported malware in the broader sense to be 
widely present in cybercrime cases. Criminals have 
converted some traditional banking Trojans into more 
advanced modular malware to cover a broader scope 
of functionality. These evolved forms of modular 
malware are a top threat in the EU, especially as 
their adaptive and expandable nature makes them 
increasingly more complicated to combat effectively. 
With a range of threat actors, this makes drawing 
general conclusions about particular threats 
challenging. In areas ranging from social engineering 
and phishing, to ransomware and other forms of 
malware, law enforcement authorities witness a broad 
spectrum of threat actors. These actors vary in terms 
of level of skill, capability and adaptability. The top 
tier criminals manage to run their operations like a 
professional enterprise, whereas less sophisticated 
threat actors tend to rely on off-the-shelf materials 
to conduct their criminal activities. The availability 
of the materials through CaaS, however, continues 
to make such activities accessible. Moreover, 
across the board threat actors in different types of 
cybercrime demonstrate their resilience. Perhaps 
more importantly, in areas such as the Darkweb, 
criminals have enhanced their cooperation and joined 
forces to provide a response to shared challenges. 
This means they are able to make their business more 
robust and in particular incorporate better security 
solutions to ensure that law enforcement are unable 
to trace them. Overall, cybercriminals are showing 
an improved level of operational security and proving 
to be highly aware of how to hide their identities and 
criminal activities from law enforcement or private 
sector companies. With cryptocurrencies, criminals 
also manage to complicate law enforcement’s ability 
to trace payments connected to criminal activities. 
To respond to the cybercrime challenges in a more 
effective manner, a number of key ingredients are 
essential. First, information sharing is at the heart 
of any strategic, tactical and operational response 
regardless of the specific type of cybercrime. 
Sharing information, which needs to be purpose-
driven and actionable, requires reliable coordination 
and cooperation from public and private partners. 
At the same time, information sharing requires a 
legal framework and attitude that is sensitive to the 
timely exchange of information, which is crucial as 
cybercriminals can move their infrastructure within 
the blink of an eye. This is particularly evident in the 
criminal abuse of the Darkweb, where short lifecycles 
of marketplaces influences law enforcement’s ability 
to conduct investigations. There is also the need 
to foster a culture of acceptance and transparency 
when organisations or individuals fall victim to 
cybercrime. Re-victimising victims after a cyber-attack 
is counterproductive and a significant challenge, as 
law enforcement need companies and individuals 
who have been subject of a crime to come forward. 
This can help resolve the challenges in reporting we 
currently face. Besides information sharing through 
enhanced coordination and cooperation, other key 
elements to include in an effective response are 
prevention and awareness and capacity building. 
We can reduce the success rate of many forms of 
cybercrime by educating individuals and organisations 
in recognising criminal activity before they fall victim 
to it. It is worth underlining the importance of the 
responsibility of industry in integrating security and 
privacy in their design as fundamental principles, 
instead of shaming end users as the weakest link. 
Through capacity building, on the other hand, law 
enforcement across different crime areas will be able 
to understand and respond to the cyber-element of 
crimes. Finally, taskforce work such as coordinating 
and de-conflicting law enforcement operational 
response, for which the Europol Joint Cybercrime 
Action Taskforce (J-CAT) platform is vital, continues to 
play a key role in the current cybercrime landscape. 
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Key findings
 » Ransomware remains the most dominant threat 
as criminals increase pressure by threatening 
publication of data if victims do not pay.
 » Ransomware on third-party providers also 
creates potential significant damage for other 
organisations in the supply chain and critical 
infrastructure.
 » Emotet is omnipresent given its versatile use 
and leads the way as the benchmark of modern 
malware.
 » The threat potential of DDoS attacks is higher 
than its current impact in the EU.
CYBER-DEPENDENT CRIME
 » Social engineering remains a top threat to 
facilitate other types of cybercrime.
 » Cryptocurrencies continue to facilitate 
payments for various forms of cybercrime, as 
developments evolve with respect to privacy-
oriented crypto coins and services.
 » Challenges with reporting hinder the ability to 




CHALLENGES TO CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS
CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION ONLINE
 » The amount of online CSAM detected continues 
to increase, further exacerbated by the COVID-19 
crisis, which has serious consequences for the 
capacity of law enforcement authorities.
 » The use of encrypted chat apps and industry 
proposals to expand this market pose a 
substantial risk for abuse and make it more 
difficult for law enforcement to detect and 
investigate  online CSE activities.
 » Online offender communities exhibit 
considerable resilience and are continuously 
evolving.
 » Livestreaming of child sexual abuse continues 
to increase and became even more prevalent  
during the COVID-19 crisis.
 » The commercialisation of online CSE is 
becoming a more widespread issue, with 
individuals uploading material to hosting sites 
and subsequently acquiring credit on the basis 
of the number of downloads. 
_9IOCTA  2020Key FIndIngs
 » SIM swapping is a key trend that allows 
perpetrators to take over accounts and has 
demonstrated a steep rise over the last year.
 » BEC remains an area of concern as it has 
increased, grown in sophistication, and become 
more targeted.
 » Online investment fraud  is  one of the fastest 
growing crimes, generating millions in losses and 
affecting thousands of victims.
 » Card-not-present (CNP) fraud continues to 
increase as criminals diversify in terms of target 
sectors and electronic skimming (e-skimming) 
modi operandi.
PAYMENT FRAUD
 » The Darkweb environment has remained volatile, 
lifecycles of Darkweb market places have 
shortened, and no clear dominant market has 
risen over the past year compared to previous 
years to fill the vacuum left by the takedowns in 
2019.
 » The nature of the Darkweb community at 
administrator-level shows how adaptive it 
is under challenging times, including more 
effective cooperation in the search for better 
security solutions and safe Darkweb interaction.
 » There has been an increase in the use of privacy-
enhanced cryptocurrencies and an emergence 
of privacy-enhanced coinjoin concepts, such as 
Wasabi and Samurai.
 » Surface web e-commerce sites and encrypted 
communication platforms offer an additional 
dimension to Darkweb trading to enhance the 
overall business model.  
THE CRIMINAL ABUSE OF THE 
DARKWEB
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Aim
The IOCTA aims to inform decision-makers at 
strategic, tactical and operational levels about the 
threats of cybercrime. The 2020 IOCTA contributes 
to setting priorities for the 2021 EMPACT operational 
action plans, which follow the three current priorities 
defined as:
1)  disrupting  criminal activities related to attacks 
against information systems, particularly those 
following CaaS business models and working as 
enablers for online crime; 
2)  combating child sexual abuse and child sexual 
exploitation, including the production and 
dissemination of child abuse material; 
3)  targeting criminals involved in fraud and 
counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, 
including large-scale payment card fraud 
(especially card-not-present (CNP) fraud), 
emerging threats to other non-cash means 
of payment and enabling criminal activities. 
Furthermore, the IOCTA aims to consolidate 
findings on current cyber threats, which could 
contribute to the discussion of research and 
development priorities as well as planning at the 
EU-level. 
Scope
The scope of the 2020 IOCTA lies in the threat 
assessment of the cybercrime landscape, consisting 
of trends and developments pertinent to the 
EMPACT priorities mentioned previously. In addition 
to this, the report will discuss other cross-cutting 
facilitators and challenges that influence or impact 
the cybercrime ecosystem, such as criminal abuse 
of cryptocurrencies and social engineering. This 
report provides an update on the latest trends and 
the current impact of cybercrime within the EU and 
beyond. 
Methodological approach
For this year’s IOCTA, Europol introduced a different 
methodological approach to gather data. For previous 
editions, the team shared a survey with all the 
Member States and several third-party countries. Each 
crime priority area received a survey, namely cyber-
dependent crime, payment fraud, and child sexual 
exploitation (CSE). This year, as a means to gather 
more qualitative and in-depth information, the team 
conducted interviews with representatives from the 
Member States and Europol partner countries. The 
team also conducted interviews with Europol experts 
from the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) and 
members of EC3’s three advisory groups on internet 
security, financial services and telecommunication 
providers. 
The semi-structured interviews contained open 
questions. As a result, the range of answers was 
broader than in the previous structured survey 
approach wherein which respondents mainly 
selected from a drop down menu. Through using 
open questions, answers became less comparable 
in a traditional sense, but rather than a limitation, the 
team perceived this is an opportunity to illustrate the 
complexity of cybercrime especially in connection to 
establishing a comprehensive threat assessment. The 
ultimate purpose of the IOCTA is to assist Member 
States in establishing priorities with respect to 
cybercrime. This pertains to the type of threats but 
also concerns other considerations such as how we 
approach this crime area in terms of analysis. 
Cybercrime is inherently complex for a number of 
reasons. With different perpetrators, different motives, 
different targets, varying modi operandi, different 
jurisdictions, etc. there are many variables, which 
complicate both the ability to gather data as well 
as the ability to compare findings. Furthermore, the 
quality of those findings encounter challenges as a 
result of the ability to register them accurately. These 
limitations must be taken into consideration with 
respect to any threat landscape report.
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Cross-cutting crime facilitators 
and challenges to criminal 
investigations1
 • Social engineering remains 
an effective top threat 




 • Cryptocurrencies 
continue to facilitate 
payments for various 
forms of cybercrime, as 
developments evolve with 
respect to privacy oriented 
crypto coins and services.
 • Challenges with reporting 
torment ability to create an 
accurate overview of crime 
prevalence across the 
European Union.
 KEY FINDINGS
Throughout the interviews, one message was clear: cybercrime 
is an evolution not a revolution1. The fundamentals of 
cybercrime stay the same, in that cybercrime is not that much 
different to other forms of more traditional crime. 
This is a crucial observation to include 
in any assessment, especially as the 
emphasis when discussing cybercrime is 
often placed on how quickly cybercrime 
and, in particular, cybercriminals change 
their tactics. Perpetrators may operate at 
the speed of the internet, as they are able to 
quickly move parts of their infrastructure, 
alter a particular aspect of the code, adapt 
the functionality, gather more victim data, 
etc, but these changes do not inherently 
alter the threat, especially not at an abstract 
level at which we discuss the threats 
within the IOCTA. We can also witness 
the evolution of cybercrime through the 
integration of the cyber-component into 
nearly all forms of traditional crime. 
Another reason to reflect on this 
observation is to understand that to 
combat cybercrime effectively we need to 
respond to several challenges. Some of 
these are included within this chapter of the 
report, whereas others are included within 
the respective chapters of the different 
crime areas. Several of these challenges 
pertain to the ability of law enforcement 
to execute its core mission of preventing 
and combatting crime, identifying 
suspects, protecting victims and arresting 
perpetrators.  
This chapter contains three key 
components. First, a reflection on 
overarching threats that are cross-
cutting facilitators for other forms of 
cybercrime. The second part includes a 
brief description of a general challenge 
with respect to gathering (accurate) data 
about the prevalence of specific forms 
of cybercrime. The third and final part 
focuses on challenges which pertain 
to law enforcement agencies’ ability to 
conduct criminal investigations due to 
societal developments that criminals 
opportunistically manage to exploit.
1.1 INTRODUCTION
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While discussions and models have emerged over 
several decades surrounding the threats posed by 
a pandemic crisis, the outbreak of COVID-19 has 
demonstrated the unfortunate impact potential of 
such crises on our daily lives across the globe. As 
physical lockdowns became the norm, cybercrime 
became more popular than before. There is no denying 
that the arrival of COVID-19 was a crucial factor in 
any development discussed with respect to 2020. 
However, COVID-19 in connection to cybercrime needs 
to be placed within its context. If anything, COVID-19 
demonstrated how cybercrime – at its core – remains 
largely the same but criminals change the narrative. 
They adapt the specifics of their approach to fit the 
societal context as a means to enhance their rate 
of success. This is not new, in many ways this is 
business as usual. The difference with COVID-19 is 
that due to the physical restrictions enacted to halt 
the spread of the virus, with a subsequent increase in 
working from home and remote access to business 
resources, many individuals and businesses that 
may not have been as active online before the crisis 
became a lucrative target. 
Traditional cybercrime activities such as phishing and 
cyber-enabled scams quickly exploited the societal 
vulnerability as many citizens and business were 
looking for information, answers and sources of help 
during this time. There were even more challenges for 
both individuals and business as teleworking during 
the pandemic became the norm. Europol followed all 
developments closely and shared its findings through 
frequent corona strategic reports2. 
Spread of disinformation enhances 
cybercrime opportunities
The pandemic also gave rise to disinformation 
campaigns and activities. Disinformation efforts 
are often associated with hybrid threats, which are 
defined as threats combining conventional and 
unconventional, military and non-military activities 
which may be used by non-state or state actors to 
achieve political aims3. A wide range of measures 
applied in hybrid campaigns include cyber-attacks 
and disinformation, disruption of critical services, 
undermining of public trust in governmental 
institutions and exploiting social vulnerabilities. The 
presence of disinformation became a crucial feature 
in the overall threat landscape during the crisis. Many 
Member States reported problems with respect to the 
spread of disinformation.
Users become vulnerable and receptive to 
disinformation and fake news due to the paradoxical 
oversaturation with available information combined 
with a perceived lack of trustworthy sources of news 
that reinforce some of the users’ preconceived notions 
and beliefs. Disinformation can also be linked to 
cybercrime in efforts to make social engineering and 
phishing attacks more impactful. 
Both seasoned cybercriminals and opportunistic 
individuals spread disinformation to benefit from it in 
different ways. Significant political motives can drive 
disinformation to influence elections or referendums 
affecting entire countries. However, for criminals the 
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1.3   DATA COMPROMISE
The majority of threats discussed within the IOCTA 
ultimately pertain to some form of data compromise. 
As a result, data compromise is not dealt with as a 
separate category within the different chapters but 
rather emphasised within this cross-cutting chapter. 
Data compromise gathers significant attention 
through the obligation of organisations to report 
data breaches under the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). GDPR considers the protection of 
data belonging to EU citizens, thus it has an ‘extra-
territorial effect’ applying to companies outside the 
EU who handle data relating to EU visitors5. Since the 
enactment of GDPR, over the past 18 months over 160 
000 data breach notifications have been handed in 
to authorities6, and a growth in interest over personal 
data handling among EU citizens7. In its annual data 
breach investigations report, Verizon reports how the 
company collected 157 525 incidents and 108 069 
breaches8. The authors, however, immediately place 
these figures within their proper context as 100 000+ 
of those breaches concerned credentials of individual 
users. These are breaches where criminals target the 
users’ credentials to gain access to bank accounts, 
cloud services, etc. 
Data compromise therefore can refer to the ability 
of criminals to access individual user credentials 
or to access large databases with potentially 
valuable information. Examples of the latter include 
data breaches at companies that often become 
public knowledge. Both of these situations are not 
mutually exclusive, and often form a starting point 
for subsequent criminal activity. The majority of 
interviewees from law enforcement authorities and 
private sector representatives mentioned social 
engineering as a top threat, which cuts across 
different crime areas, affecting both cyber-dependent 
and cyber-enabled crime and illustrates the key role 
played by data compromise.
Law enforcement case study
European law enforcement conducted 
an investigation of ten cases of fraud 
related to technical support scams. The 
perpetrators initially communicated mainly 
via telephone with their victims, pretending 
to be technicians at a software company 
support centre. Under the pretext that 
their computer and/or mobile device are 
"infected" by malware, criminals asked 
the victims to install remote access 
software to allegedly solve the issue. 
In this way, the criminals gained full 
access to the computer or mobile device 
and consequently to the - stored on the 
devices - personal data. Through use of the 
personal data, the perpetrators transferred 
money from the electronic bank accounts 
(e-banking) to bank accounts controlled by 
themselves or their accomplices. In many 
cases, they even demanded the installation 
of remote management programmes on 
the victims’ mobile phones, so that they 
could receive text messages (SMS) with 
the one-use codes (OTPs), which financial 
institutions send for security reasons. The 
investigation identified four individuals who 
were active or involved as money mules. 
ultimate aim is always to obtain profit. Some individuals 
simply seek to obtain direct financial gain through 
digital advertisements, as engagement with fake 
news messages about COVID-19 can be very high. 
The number of new domains and websites related to 
COVID-19 soared at the start of the pandemic4.  
Another strategy to profit financially from the 
COVID-19 crisis was to spread fake news about 
potential cures for the virus or effective prevention 
measures. Such messages also facilitated criminals 
seeking to sell items that they claim will help prevent 
or cure COVID-19, which emerged both on the Clearnet 
and the Darkweb.
The hybrid nature of this threat underlines the 
importance of a combined, hybrid response, especially 
considering that law enforcement agencies are not 
typically mandated with investigating cases involving 
disinformation or fake news, despite their potential to 
bolster criminal activities.
Social engineering
Social engineering and phishing remain a key threat. 
Based on interviewee responses, both demonstrate 
a significant increase in volume and sophistication. 
While some of the increase may be attributable to 
improved reporting mechanisms, it has also become 
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easier for technically inexperienced criminals to 
carry out phishing campaigns using existing criminal 
infrastructure and support services – a trend that is 
expected to continue in the future.
Targeting human weakness in the security chain, 
social engineering and phishing have a high impact 
on society and enable the majority of cybercrimes, 
ranging from scams and extortion to the acquisition of 
sensitive information and the execution of advanced 
malware attacks.
While criminals typically employ social engineering 
to convince targets to engage in fraudulent schemes 
unknowingly, criminals use phishing to either 
distribute malware or to obtain credentials and gain 
access to sensitive accounts and systems.
More sophisticated and more targeted 
phishing
A key trend over the past year relates to the growing 
sophistication9 of phishing. Phishing has become 
more difficult to detect, with many phishing emails 
and sites being almost identical to the real ones. At 
the same time, phishing campaigns have become 
faster and more automated, forcing respondents to 
act quicker than before as in some cases it takes one 
day from a credential leak to an attack. 
Overall, cybercriminals are employing a more holistic 
strategy to phishing by showing a high level of  
competency concerning the use of tools, systems 
and vulnerabilities they exploit, assuming false 
identities and working in close cooperation with other 
cybercriminals. Regarding the latter, criminals have 
shown their sense for innovation, as they use shared 
platforms to distribute their scams, which makes 
blocking or tracing difficult for incident responders. 
Criminals have also been observed maintaining a level 
of situational awareness, with a number of phishing 
campaigns having taken advantage of the COVID-19 
pandemic10.  
Further to this, criminals have also employed a much 
more targeted approach when attacking their victims. 
Advanced actors focus more on selected victims 
as opposed to a random group in order to optimise 
financial gains, as they are becoming increasingly 
specialised in information gathering and victim 
profiling activities. As the main threat relates to spear 
phishing, criminals have proven apt at adapting their 
attacks to a specific context for fraud schemes in 
particular, for instance by improving their language 
skills or even using local ‘customer agents’ who 
communicate with their victims speaking their regional 
accents, or by making reference to current cultural, 
political, and local events.
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In addition to employing a targeted approach, 
cybercriminals are adopting a more agile approach, 
constantly looking to harvest data and sensitive 
information from victims, which they can use to 
enable additional crimes. Lack of security awareness 
and a significant amount of open-source intelligence 
surrounding personal information of employees of 
businesses available online enable criminals to gather 
the information they need. Other forms of personal 
information harvested and abused by criminals may 
include financial and personal details, as well as login 
credentials for various sensitive accounts. 
The majority of social engineering and phishing 
attacks are successful due to inadequate security 
measures potentially in combination with a lack 
of awareness by the users. Particularly the latter 
was highlighted repeatedly, as attacks do not have 
to be necessarily complicated or advanced to be 
successful – badly set up attacks still succeed by 
exploiting people as the weak part of the security 
chain. Accordingly, basic cyber hygiene and improved 
user awareness are some of the key success factors 
in curbing part of this threat.
Finally, cybercriminals are demonstrating an improved 
overall level of operational security and proving to 
be highly aware of how to hide their identities and 
criminal activities from law enforcement or private 
sector companies. In some cases, once a phishing 
attempt is being investigated, the whole criminal 
infrastructure has already vanished. Similarly, 
criminals may put in place technical measures to 
avoid suspicion. Through their deny/allow11 lists of 
internet protocol (IP) addresses, for instance, criminals 
may forward the user to the genuine website if certain 
conditions are met (i.e. access through a computer, 
instead of a mobile phone, or from foreign IP address). 
As such, only the users selected as targets by 
criminals are re-routed to the phishing site.
CaaS as a facilitator of phishing and other 
forms of cybercrime
Cybercrime-as-a-Service (CaaS) facilitates phishing. 
Offerings on the Darkweb help criminals significantly 
improve overall technical complexity of their 
attacks without the need for advanced technical 
understanding. In recent years, CaaS has increasingly 
enabled even technically inexperienced criminals to 
carry out phishing campaigns by providing exploit 
kits, access to compromised systems and vulnerable 
remote desktop protocols (RDPs). 
Here, criminals have also been reported to make 
increased use of legitimate commercial services such 
Bust of hacker group selling databases 
with millions of user credentials 
Polish and Swiss law enforcement 
authorities, supported by Europol and 
Eurojust, dismantled InfinityBlack, a 
hacking group involved in distributing 
stolen user credentials, creating and 
distributing malware and hacking tools, and 
fraud. 
On 29 April 2020, the Polish National 
Police searched six locations in five Polish 
regions and arrested five individuals 
believed to be members of the hacking 
group InfinityBlack. Police seized electronic 
equipment, external hard drives and 
hardware cryptocurrency wallets, all 
worth around €100 000. The police closed 
down two platforms with databases 
containing over 170 million. The hacking 
group created online platforms to sell user 
login credentials known as ‘combos’. The 
group was efficiently organised into three 
defined teams. Developers created tools 
to test the quality of the stolen databases, 
while testers analysed the suitability of 
authorisation data. Project managers 
then distributed subscriptions against 
cryptocurrency payments.
The hacking group’s main source of revenue 
came from stealing loyalty scheme login 
credentials and selling them on to other, 
less technical criminal gangs. These gangs 
would then exchange the loyalty points for 
expensive electronic devices.
The hackers created a sophisticated script 
to gain access to a large number of Swiss 
customer accounts. Although the losses 
are estimated at €50 000, hackers had 
access to accounts with potential losses 
of more than €610 000. The fraudsters and 
hackers, among them minors and young 
adults, were unmasked when using the 
stolen data in shops in Switzerland.
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1.4 CRYPTOCURRENCIES FACILITATE PAYMENT 
FOR ALL FORMS OF CYBERCRIME
The abuse of cryptocurrencies continue to play an 
important role in facilitating payments for transactions 
across all areas of cybercrime. Reliability, irreversibility 
of transactions and a perceived degree of anonymity 
have made cryptocurrencies the default payment 
method for victim-to-criminal payments in ransomware 
and other extortion schemes, as well as criminal-to-
criminal payments on the Darkweb. These activities 
have been long established with Silk Road emerging in 
2011 and Cryptolocker hitting its first victims in 2013. 
At that time, more than 20% of transactions were 
directly attributable to criminal activity. Although the 
level of criminal abuse has grown substantially, the 
legitimate use of cryptocurrencies grew at a much 
faster rate. In 2019, the overwhelming majority of 
bitcoin transactions were linked to investment and 
trading activity so, despite considerable abuse, 
criminal activity corresponds to only 1.1% of total 
transactions12. The figure includes transactions 
stemming from fraudulent activities, Darkweb trade, 
thefts and ransomware.
Criminals continue to use cryptocurrency 
as a method of payment for extortion 
activities
Although Initial Coin Offering scams and a wide 
range of Ponzi schemes abusing the increasing 
popularity of cryptocurrencies dominated criminal 
abuse by volume, most of the crimes reported to law 
enforcement included various forms of extortion. 
The last two years have seen an increase in extortion 
spam, where the suspect attempts to frighten the 
victim with a promise of a devastating event should 
they not receive payment in cryptocurrency, typically 
bitcoin corresponding to hundreds or even thousands 
of euros. While in its most basic form the suspect 
simply expects naïve victims to trust the threat, a 
slightly more advanced approach includes victims’ 
passwords, typically leaked from one of the large 
public data breaches. 
The extortion scam typically involves sextortion, theft 
of data or, more recently, COVID-19 related threats. 
While the majority of the population is immune to 
such attempts, criminals still seem to benefit from 
the activity. The scalability of cybercrime compared 
to traditional forms of crime presents a key challenge, 
as cybercriminals can target a relatively large number 
of potential victims with relatively low investment, 
being able to profit despite a small percentage of 
responses. According to a recent study analysing 
a subset of 4 million intercepted sextortion emails, 
over 12 500 bitcoin addresses were extracted, 245 
of which received one or more payments13. Although 
such efficiency is much lower than observed across 
ransomware campaigns, it is still much more lucrative 
when compared to traditional low-tech scams.
Cryptocurrency users also target of 
criminals
The growing adoption of cryptocurrencies increases 
the number of vulnerable victims, so it is no surprise 
that thefts from individual and enterprise wallets 
have become more prominent over the last few years. 
In 2019, there were 10 publicly confirmed hacks of 
exchanges where criminals stole cryptocurrencies, 
resulting in a theft of €240 million worth of assets. 
Although the number of incidents was higher than 
in any of the previous years, the total amount stolen 
decreased compared to the previous year with €950 
million stolen in 2018, including almost €500 million 
stolen from Japanese exchange Coincheck14. 
Cooperation with the private sector
While a massive effort has taken place in the 
cryptocurrency industry to deal with proceeds from 
criminal activities, the exchanges still differ in the 
degree to which they address the issue and the level 
of assistance they provide to investigators. In order 
to assess the players across the industry, Europol is 
as encrypted email and messaging applications as 
well as Virtual private network (VPN) providers to 
hide criminal activity, exploiting increasingly privacy-
oriented policies, which make it difficult for law 
enforcement to gain relevant information in time. 
Often, these less obvious legitimate services are safer 
for criminals to use and minimise risks associated 
with using underground services more commonly 
used by criminals in the past.
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conducting the first international law enforcement 
survey15 addressing the issue of cooperation with 
the major cryptocurrency exchanges and payment 
services.
The cryptocurrency industry and exchanges in 
particular have continued strengthening their know 
your customer (KYC) measures, either through their 
increasing effort to identify rogue clients or by a 
growing set of legislation affecting the industry.
In Europe, the most important legislative development 
in this area was a transposition of the 5th Anti-
Money Laundering Directive. The Directive states that 
cryptocurrency exchanges and wallet providers who 
own private keys of their clients are obliged entities, 
mandating them, among other things, to a proper 
identification of their clients. The Directive obliges 
all European Union Member States to implement 
the legislation by January 2020. Twenty countries 
have implemented it on time16 with more doing so 
throughout this year. While individual countries were 
given a large degree of flexibility when transposing the 
Directive, this development contributed to a much-
needed harmonisation of legislation.
The number of cryptocurrency automated teller 
machines (ATMs) is continuously growing and 
surpassed 9 000 ATMs around the world in 202017. 
Traditionally, ATMs have often been perceived as 
a way to privately obtain or sell cryptocurrency. 
Nevertheless, compliance also gradually improves, as 
an increasing number of operators require customer 
identification and flag suspicious transactions.
Challenges to feature more prominently in 
future investigations
A large number of factors have rendered 
cryptocurrency investigations more challenging and 
we can expect these to feature more prominently 
in future investigations. These include centralised 
and decentralised mixing services, privacy coins, 
exchanges with insufficient KYC requirements, 
clandestine over-the-counter trading, nested services, 
where the exchange is incorporated within a wallet or 
another service and decentralised exchanges. 
The obfuscation methods continue to develop. 
Centralised mixers troubled with exit scams and high 
fees seem to be gradually replaced by non-custodial 
mixing solutions where users do not need to send 
bitcoins to a third party. Privacy-focused services 
Looking ahead: 
Malicious use of artificial 
intelligence
Artificial intelligence (AI) is at the heart 
of the so-called 4th industrial revolution 
and promises greater efficiency, higher 
levels of automation and autonomy. AI is 
intrinsically a dual use technology: while it 
can bring enormous benefits to society, AI 
can also enable a range of digital, physical 
and political threats. Therefore, the risks 
and potential criminal abuse of AI systems 
need to be well understood in order to 
protect against malicious actors.
For instance, criminals could make use of 
AI to facilitate and improve their attacks 
by maximising opportunities for profit in a 
shorter time, exploiting new victims, and 
creating more innovative criminal business 
models, while reducing the chances of 
being caught. As ‘AI-as-a-Service’ becomes 
more widespread, it lowers the entry 
barrier to criminal activities by reducing 
the skills and technical expertise needed 
to employ it. This further exacerbates 
the potential for AI to be abused by 
criminals and become a driver of crime. 
Concrete scenarios include AI malware, 
AI-supported social engineering, AI-
based password guessing, AI-aided 
reconnaissance or AI-facilitated content 
creation, to mention a few.
It is therefore necessary, in close 
cooperation with industry and academia, 
to develop a body of knowledge on the 
potential use of AI by criminals with a view 
to better anticipating possible malicious 
and criminal activities facilitated by AI, as 
well as to prevent, respond to, or mitigate 
the effects of such attacks in a pro-active 
manner. Understanding of capabilities, 
scenarios, and attack vectors is the key to 
enhancing preparedness and increasing 
resilience.
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Cryptocurrency as an investigation 
opportunity
Cryptocurrency investigations have become 
an essential tool for many cybercrime 
investigators. While the role of Europol is to 
support investigations in the Member States, 
we could no longer ignore a high demand 
for relevant practical training. To cope 
with an increasing demand for a hands-on 
e-learning experience Europol in cooperation 
with CENTRIC launched CRYPTOPOL, an 
educational game for investigators in October 
2019. CRYPTOPOL is accessible to all law 
enforcement cryptocurrency investigators 
around the world who can contact Europol 
to request access to the game.  As the game 
contains information about tracing techniques 
used by law enforcement there is no intention 
of making it publicly available.
1.5 CHALLENGES WITH 
REPORTING PLAGUE ABILITY  
TO CREATE ACCURATE 
OVERVIEW OF CRIME
Several interviewees indicated how they are unable 
to provide a comprehensive overview of the number 
and types of crimes executed within a particular crime 
area. This is the result of a number of factors. First, 
the ability to register a specific crime is not always 
possible. Crime registration systems are diverse, and 
several interviewees indicated they were in a process 
of advancing their ability to gather more specific crime 
reporting data, i.e. specifying what type of cybercrime 
took place. In one Member State, ransomware, for 
example, was not a separate category, as the country 
maintains a general category for data breaches. Having 
a general code for data breaches led to classification 
problems, according to the Member State representative, 
as different types of crimes fall into the same category.
Second, victims often do not report the crime. Crime 
reporting is a general problem as such receives attention 
as part of a broader Victim Rights Strategy18. Victims 
may not see the value of doing so as law enforcement 
have limited resources to conduct investigations. Yet, 
reporting the crime can also help law enforcement in 
its quantitative justification to support the request for 
more resources. Moreover, the more victims report a 
crime, the more data law enforcement can gather and 
the more likely connections between different crimes 
can be established. One of the interviewees indicated 
how under-reporting prevents law enforcement from 
forming the bigger picture and gathering reliable data, 
and monitoring whether cybercrime has been increasing 
or decreasing in reality. 
aside, the bitcoin protocol itself is expected to soon 
implement features that will make it less transparent 
to casual observers and investigators alike. 
Cybercriminals will increasingly turn to marketplaces 
that support decentralised transactions. More 
marketplaces are likely to deprecate the traditional 
centralised model with deposit and escrow accounts 
in favour of direct transactions between buyers 
and sellers, decreasing the influence of market 
administrators and discouraging exit scams. 
The other explanation for a lack of reporting from 
victims, at least with respect to the general public, is a 
lack of awareness. One interviewee indicated having 
witnessed a significant increase in cybercrime figures, 
but offered as an explanation that it may in fact be the 
result of greater awareness from the public. Others 
indicated there is no incentive to report as the focus is 
on business continuity.
Third, law enforcement at a national level often find 
out about a potential case through the media or 
through their local police. Crime registration at local 
police level maintains its own challenges as local 
police units may not have the expertise to assist a 
victim of cybercrime. Additionally, the information 
reported to local police may not find its way to 
national or central units, meaning law enforcement at 
is unable to connect the dots on a national scale and 
with their respective international partners. 
Cybercrime in the media
Law enforcement officials also indicated using media 
as a source of crime reporting, which is not the 
preferred method as such reporting maintains its own 
challenges. Cybercrime is a complicated area filled 
with technical elements and cross-cutting issues, 
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which make it difficult to create a clear picture of 
the landscape. A lack of understanding of key terms, 
concepts and a limited viewpoint have shaped the 
way mainstream media have portrayed cybercrime 
to wider audiences. Sophisticated emerging 
technologies, human-relatable narratives, and high-
profile cases (vis-à-vis victims or perpetrators) tend to 
dominate media headlines. 
The complexity and terminological challenges of 
cybercrime can lead to inconsistencies between what 
the media reports and what the security community 
says about an incident. It is also not helpful that 
many companies name the same groups or attacks 
differently, enhancing the potential confusion. The 
complexity can lead to the perception of cybercrime 
as a highly sophisticated and intelligent field of crime. 
However, while for some cases this is an accurate 
assessment, this perception may lead to neglect of 
the human element of cybercrime, which is much 
less complex to comprehend. Additionally, there 
are many forms of cybercrime which are relatively 
unsophisticated, but which have substantial impact 
nonetheless. Cybercrime has a genuine human impact 
and individuals can do a lot to improve their resilience 
against different kinds of cyber threats if they are 
aware of them. Reporters may lack a coherent 
understanding of the cybercrime field, often mixing 
cyber-enabled fraud with cyber-dependent crime. 
Where a high-profile incident occurs, an excessive 
focus on such cases may lead to indirect re-
victimisation and, in some cases, directly casting 
blame on the victim, which harms 
investigations. Law enforcement 
view the media highlighting the more 
dramatic cases, while often ignoring the 
low-value but high volume cybercrime. 
When victims are essentially the only 
possible source of information in 
criminal cases, they are not likely to 
be willing to share information on their 
victimisation. This is particularly true 
with BEC and ransomware. Media 
reporting can turn the incident into 
a scandal story, which could lead to 
further victimisation and reputational 
damage. 
Using media for awareness 
raising
According to law enforcement and 
private sector respondents, due to 
the receptive nature of several media 
outlets, there is substantial room to 
work collaboratively with media to 
raise awareness of neglected areas of cybercrime 
which have a substantial impact on EU citizens. There 
are extensive calls to have clearer, more accurate 
representation of cybercrime to public audiences. Law 
enforcement are calling for prevention to be covered 
more extensively. If done right, the media could 
become a powerful actor in cybercrime prevention, 
for example by exposing the adoption of new kinds of 
technologies and methods by cybercriminals. 
Law enforcement has reported good reception 
among media representatives in raising awareness of 
concrete cybercrime issues. Active presence on social 
media by law enforcement, and sending out notices 
on cybercrime, is often well received by media and 
the public19.  The media often picks up and shares the 
story. 
This is important, as, for example, phishing and social 
engineering attacks rely on convincing humans to 
fall for fraudulent activities, which makes raising 
awareness on these threats potentially more impactful 
than focusing on disseminating high profile incidents. 
As national media outlets often spearhead media 
reporting in Member States, it would be important 
for the public and private sectors to engage with 
them regularly, raise awareness and communicate 
elaborately the realities of the threat landscape, which 
could help boost resilience against threats. People 
usually report crimes more after certain information is 
disseminated on threats.
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1.6 LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO DATA CONTINUES  
TO CHALLENGE INVESTIGATIONS
For several years now, the advancement and increased 
implementation of certain technological developments 
have complicated the ability of law enforcement to 
gain access to and gather relevant data for criminal 
investigations. One of the most prominent examples in 
this regard remains the widespread use of encryption, 
which contains many benefits from a security 
perspective but is also a development that criminals 
have gratefully used to their advantage20. Europol has 
spoken about this in previous iterations of the IOCTA 
and jointly with Eurojust in its dedicated Observatory 
Function reports in 2019 and 2020. 
Encryption continues to become a mainstream 
feature of an increasing number of services and 
tools. One example is the Domain Name System 
(DNS) over Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure 
(HTTPs). DNS is one of the most important databases 
in the internet infrastructure. Increased concern 
over the monitoring of DNS traffic has led to the 
standardisation of modern DNS resolution protocols 
that make use of encryption. One of the protocols, 
which received increased popularity and adoption is 
DNS over HTTPS (DoH), after being introduced as a 
default setting on the application level. Even though 
the DoH protocol was created to solve historical DNS 
concerns regarding security and privacy, the potential 
centralisation of DNS traffic around a handful of 
commercial and private organisations has arisen as 
a result. Tracing historical DNS records is an effective 
tool when it comes to criminal investigations. Access 
to DNS queries is also used to great effect in dealing 
with botnets. Access to the network traffic between 
the criminal source and the remote DNS service 
provider, however, will now barely be possible due 
to traffic encryption, which will make the detection 
and blocking of malicious traffic, botnets and other 
malicious applications impossible. 
As queries to the DNS will be encrypted, ability to gain 
access to such data will be more complicated for law 
enforcement, and countries hosting the majority of the 
DoH service providers will receive the vast majority of 
the internet DNS lookups, compared to the previous 
national decentralisation of these sensitive queries. 
As a consequence of this, most of the DoH-related 
investigations will involve international legal requests 
to those jurisdictions. The DoH provider is likely to 
have a privacy policy in place, which will make it even 
more difficult for law enforcement to receive the 
necessary information for crime investigations. Finally, 
while positioned as a privacy-enhancing technology, it 
still allows internet service providers (ISPs) to profile 
users as other data points of the Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) traffic remain unencrypted. 
Other related developments include the use of 
cryptocurrencies by criminals, as indicated earlier 
in this chapter. Whereas law enforcement, including 
Europol, continues to focus on improving capabilities 
in the area of cryptocurrency tracing, significant 
challenges remain. 
Encrochat investigation provides new 
insights into organised crime 
The value of being able to access data of criminal 
communication becomes most apparent when law 
enforcement succeeds in gaining such access. The 
case of Encrochat, an encrypted phone network 
widely used by criminals, is perhaps the most 
effective illustration of how encrypted data can 
provide law enforcement with crucial leads beyond 
the cybercrime area. It should be emphasised that 
the platform targeted by this investigation catered 
specifically to the needs of criminals. The phones 
using the platform were provided pre-configured and 
advertised to meet the needs of criminals and to 
secure the users against surveillance or investigation 
methods used by law enforcement parties. The 
phones are sold guaranteeing anonymity utilising 
a network of re-sellers, which are often themselves 
involved in other criminal activities, and are not 
distributed via regular retail outlets. In early 2020, 
EncroChat was one of the largest known providers 
of encrypted digital communication with a very high 
share of users engaged in criminal activity. User 
hotspots were particularly present in source and 
destination countries for cocaine and cannabis trade, 
as well as in money laundering centres. In July 2020, 
Europol reported on a joint investigation which made 
it possible for law enforcement to intercept, share 
and analyse millions of messages that criminals 
exchanged to plan serious crimes. 
While the activities on EncroChat have ceased, 
this complex operation shows the global scope of 
serious and organised crime and the connectivity of 
criminal networks who use advanced technologies 
to cooperate on a national and international level. 
The information has already been relevant in a large 
number of ongoing criminal investigations, resulting 
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in the disruption of criminal activities including violent 
attacks, corruption, attempted murders and large-
scale drug transports. Certain messages indicated 
plans to commit imminent violent crimes and 
triggered immediate action. 
This investigation confirms that advanced 
technologies enable criminals to secretly 
communicate or transfer illicit goods and resources. 
There is a growing risk to public safety as organised 
crime are drawn to using encrypted communication 
platforms that are almost technically impossible for 
law enforcement to access. Due to these emerging 
technologies used by criminals and the opportunities 
new technology may pose for law enforcement, an 
even more intense thinking beyond law enforcement 
cooperation is required, including with the private 
sector.
While the dismantling of EncroChat is a considerable 
success against serious and organised crime and the 
result of a multi-national investigation, the ingredients 
needed to come to such a success include the ideal 
combination of information, resources, skills, partners 
and opportunity. This means this type of success is 
an exception as the rule remains that law enforcement 
continues to battle the challenges of criminal use of 
advanced technologies. 
Bulletproof hosters are the backbone of 
criminal infrastructure 
An important building block of the criminal 
infrastructure is bulletproof hosting (BPH) – an 
essential CaaS offering, which continues to be a 
crucial facilitator for criminals and a hindrance for 
law enforcement by challenging identification and 
attribution efforts. BPH refers to a type of hosting or 
hosting provider that earns its money by consciously 
accepting perpetrators of crime as part of its clientele, 
offering them technical infrastructure resilient to law 
enforcement disruption or takedown. There are some 
hosting providers who may be negligent in acting on 
illegal content or criminal activity hosted by them, 
which is also an area of concern for law enforcement; 
however, the hosting providers that consciously act in 
or support the interest of the criminals ought to be the 
primary focus. These providers make their willingness 
to support criminal activity part of their appeal and 
their business model. This is a crucial advantage for 
criminals as hosting providers can play a central role 
in allowing criminal activity to continue.
As an infrastructure element, BPH facilitates a broad 
variety of key threats, including CSAM, terrorism-
related content, command and control (C&C) servers 
used in cyber-attacks as well as platforms for criminal-
to-criminal trade and discussion21. It is linked to 
several threats in cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled 
crime, making it a key concern in the threat landscape. 
As such, both the private and public sectors have a 
key role to play in hindering a BPH criminal application. 
This calls for cooperation internationally, as well as 
an appropriate legislative framework which would 
hinder BPH providers from acting maliciously by 
hosting criminal interests. For example, regional 
internet registries, local internet registries and ISPs 
have a significant responsibility in maintaining data 
accuracy when sub-allocating IP addresses to network 
operators in order to maintain traceability, with 
regard to combatting BPH, as IP addresses have a 
substantial role in BPH. 
BPH providers may run their own static servers to 
host malicious content of their clients. BPH services 
have also registered as resellers with low-end service 
providers (for example ISPs, large hosting providers 
and content delivery networks) due to low-level 
verification and authentication requirements. With the 
growth of cloud services, a new modus operandi has 
emerged in which threat actors rent virtual private 
servers from legitimate hosting providers using fake or 
stolen identities. This highlights the need for stronger 
KYC policies with businesses and organisations 
across the sector.
Case example
In September 2019, German law 
enforcement managed to identify 
and arrest the main suspect running 
a BPH service from a bunker. This 
BPH facilitated illicit marketplaces for 
various kinds of drugs, CSAM and CaaS. 
Specifically, the WallStreet Market and 
Flugsvamp 2.0 were able to run on the 
servers of the bunker in Traben-Trarbach, 
Germany22.  
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Cyber-dependent crime2  C R I M E  P R I O R I T Y 
 KEY FINDINGS
 • Ransomware remains the 
most dominant threat as 
criminals increase the 
pressure by threatening 
publication of data if 
victims do not pay. 
 
 
 • Ransomware on third-party 
providers also creates 
potential significant 
damage for other 
organisations in the supply 
chain as well as critical 
infrastructure. 
 
 • Emotet is omnipresent 
through its versatile use 
as it leads the way as a 
benchmark of modern 
malware.
 • The threat potential of 
DDoS attacks is higher 
than its current impact in 
the EU.
The clear majority of law enforcement 
respondents named ransomware as a top 
priority threat yet again. As reported in previous 
years’ IOCTA reports, ransomware remains 
one of the, if not the, most dominant threat, 
especially for public and private organisations 
within as well as outside Europe. Besides 
ransomware, European law enforcement 
reported malware in the broader sense to be 
widely present in cybercrime cases. Malware 
attacks on organisations that play a crucial role 
in the supply chains of major organisations 
have been a significant development over the 
past year. The third threat, the DDoS attack, 
celebrated its 20th anniversary in 2019 and 
ongoing investigations show that the DDoS 
threat is still prevalent in the cyber landscape. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION
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2.2 RANSOMWARE
The clear majority of law enforcement respondents 
named ransomware as a top priority threat yet 
again. As reported in previous years’ IOCTA reports, 
ransomware remains one of the, if not the, most 
dominant threat, especially for public and private 
organisations within as well as outside Europe. 
What makes it even more challenging as a threat, is 
the impact it has on its victims. This victimisation 
goes beyond the primary target, most often a public 
organisation or private business, as ransomware 
also affects those whose data is compromised. 
Considering the scale of damage that ransomware 
can inflict, victims also appear to be reluctant to come 
forward to law enforcement authorities or the public 
when they have been victimised, which makes it more 
difficult to identify and investigate such cases. With 
ransomware, criminals do not only abuse encryption 
to hide their identity and obfuscate their financial 
transactions but also actively abuse encryption as 
part of their modus operandi. This leads to a situation 
where they can almost act with impunity. 
Ransomware is becoming increasingly 
targeted
Criminals continued the trend introduced last year 
by making their ransomware attacks increasingly 
sophisticated and more targeted. The number of 
targeted ransomware cases has increased over the 
past year, which has led to a significant increase in 
threat actor capability as well as a higher impact on 
victims. 
Ransomware attackers continue to target public 
and private sector organisations of various size, 
industry and nationality rather than individual personal 
computers (PCs). This enables threat actors to 
increase both the ransom amount requested and the 
probability of successfully making the victim pay the 
ransom. Victim reconnaissance plays a significant 
role in the preparation of an attack. European law 
enforcement and Europol have observed attacks 
targeting local governments and ministries; other 
public sector organisations in healthcare and 
education (including hospitals, universities and high 
schools); as well as businesses in manufacturing, 
finance, energy, and transport industries. While the 
context of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis has affected 
the cybercrime field, ransomware attacks targeting 
the healthcare industry took place well before the 
crisis had a substantial effect in Europe and the US, 
which suggests that the COVID-19 crisis was not a 
trigger for these kinds of attacks23. What COVID-19 
brought was an increase of the attack surface, with 
unmanaged endpoints/devices (PC systems) being 
remotely connected and having access to companies’ 
information technology (IT) infrastructure. The fast 
shift to telework made some companies ‘alleviate’ 
some of their IT security policies and some IT security 
responsibility has been transferred to the individual 
users, where varying levels of (or lack of) associated 
security training has created a new gap in security. 
This gap has subsequently provided new ways 
for cyber-actors to gain access to companies’ IT 
infrastructure.
Typically, ransomware attacks deployed against 
large corporations occur in different stages and 
are executed by different threat actors. The first 
initial step (performed by one group of criminals) of 
a ransomware infection is the computer/network 
intrusion which is done by the use of multiple attack 
vectors and malware types. The access is then 
sold to different cybercriminals that perform IT 
infrastructure mapping, privilege escalation, lateral 
move, data exfiltration etc. and finalised by deploying 
the ransomware. 
Ransomware and third-party providers 
form a lethal combination
Ransomware has shown to pose a significant indirect 
threat to businesses and organisations by targeting 
supply chains and third-party service providers. 
Europol has followed up on attacks on organisations 
playing a key role in the supply chains of major 
financial institutions, which are believed to be an 
attempt by the attackers to enhance pressure on the 
victim to pay the ransom. Private sector respondents 
reported concerns over the differences in the IT 
security apparatus across supply chains, which leaves 
companies that play a key role as a service provider 
vulnerable to attacks. These attacks then have an 
impact across the whole supply chain, which may 
do substantial damage through long downtime or 
information leaks for organisations indirectly affected 
by the attack. One case saw an IT service provider 
being attacked with Maze ransomware, which can sit 
on the victim’s servers for several months. This allows 
criminals to perform reconnaissance by monitoring 
internal communications in order to identify a key 
moment, such as merging, selling, big meetings with 
customers/sales, etc., for the deployment of the 
ransomware. Criminals deploy the ransomware before 
such events with the aim of putting pressure on the 
victim. At the same time, criminals can also exfiltrate 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
the data prior to the deployment of the ransomware 
to have another means of pressuring the victim. The 
existing presence of the criminals on the victim’s 
servers is difficult to identify by security investigators 
as the security measures mainly focus on inbound 
detection. 
A perverse twist to guarantee payment: 
threatening to auction or wipe data
Ransomware attackers have introduced a new way 
of pressuring their victims to pay by stealing the 
victim’s sensitive data and threatening to publish it 
online. Once criminals gain a foothold on victims’ 
networks, which can be done in various ways, they 
explore the networks and exfiltrate data, before 
delivering the ransomware. If the victim fails to pay 
the ransom demand, attackers will post the victim’s 
sensitive data online or sell it to the highest bidder. 
The group behind Sodinokibi ransomware has already 
attempted to auction data which it gathered from a 
ransomware attack24. According to Member States 
and private sector respondents, several ransomware 
families including Sodinokibi (also known as REvil), 
Maze, Doppelpaymer, Nemty and Snatch published 
data which criminals stole from their victims over the 
past year. In particular, the auctioning of the data by 
criminal groups marks a new step and demonstrates 
an escalation in methods aimed at coercing victims to 
pay the ransom. It is anticipated that other groups will 
begin to adopt these coercive measures too.  
Additionally, in the 2018 IOCTA Europol predicted 
scenarios in which fines for violating the GDPR could 
be used by threat actors as additional leverage with 
regard to the threat of leaking their victim’s data 
online25. Both Member States and private sector 
respondents witnessed this phenomenon over the 
past year. Some ransom notes specifically mention 
GDPR fines to enhance the pressure on victims.
Fig. 1 A screenshot of a data auctioning session online26.
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An alternative to the publication of data is its 
destruction. Some ransomware families, such as 
NotPetya have destructive wiper functionalities which 
may cause irreversible damage to the victim. Europol 
observed a case of destructive malware which took 
place in 2020, in which attackers managed to rewrite 
the master boot record. 
 
Investment costs for criminals increase, 
but so do the potential profits 
While the overall investment cost of ransomware is 
increasing, the amounts extorted by attackers have 
increased too. Attackers who launch ransomware 
attacks have requested ransom from anywhere 
between less than a thousand to millions of euros. The 
damages caused by e.g. downtime have increased 
significantly as well. When targeting their victims, 
European law enforcement found attackers surveying 
their victims and assessing both the victim’s capacity 
_27IOCTA  2020Cyber-dependent CrIme
THE MALWARE THAT HOLDS YOUR 
DATA HOSTAGE FOR A PRICE
HOW DOES IT SPREAD?
Ransomware prevents users from accessing their 
system or devices, asking them to pay a ransom through 
certain online payment methods by an established 
deadline in order to regain control of their data.
Connecting infected external 
devices (such as USBs) to your 
computer system
Clicking on malicious 
links and attachments
Downloading fake 




Ransomware TIPS & ADVICE
to pay (by reading e.g. financial reports) and the 
most effective way of infecting as many machines as 
possible during the attack. Attackers have also used 
encrypted communication means (such as Protonmail, 
Tutanota and cock.li) and set up customer service 
portals – many times a hidden service on Tor darknet 
– to help facilitate the extortion process. 
Ransomware attackers are becoming increasingly 
innovative in pursuing profits from the crime area. In 
addition to shifting to corporate and organisational 
targets and finding new ways of adding leverage to 
their extortion, threat actors are seen collaborating 
with other criminals and adding new layers to 
their attacks, including crypto mining. Increasingly 
professional affiliate schemes are reflected in the 
increase in migration among criminal affiliates, as was 
seen with the migration from GandCrab to Sodinokibi. 
Ransomware attacks display higher skill, 
sophistication and adaptivity among threat 
actors 
Ransomware attacks continue to be a relatively 
diverse, low risk and easy way for cybercriminals to 
acquire money. The level of sophistication also varies 
across threat actors. European law enforcement 
reported at least two distinct types of ransomware 
actors: lone actors who utilise data and services from 
Darkweb market places, who demand ransom up to 
five thousand euros; and well-organised crime groups 
with better technical capabilities targeting higher-
value targets for ransom of up to millions of euros. 
Threat actors have displayed significant adaptability 
in conducting lateral movement, reconnaissance and 
in establishing new footholds. Several stages are still 
executed through more manual steps (and again by 
using legitimate tools) where lack of strong internal 
controls and logging does not expose and reveal the 
suspicious activities. The availability of Ransomware-
as-a-Service (RaaS) on Darkweb marketplaces has 
also decreased the barrier of entry for new, less skilful 
criminal actors. Lockbit, for example, which emerged in 
January 2020, was brokered on underground forums 
for other cybercriminals to use27. However, on the 
opposite side, already established and mature RaaS 
actors have raised the bar by including only trusted 
affiliates into affiliate programmes. These trusted 
affiliates have previously displayed the capacity to 
infect large companies. Affiliates that cannot infect 
large companies or are inactive on the platform for 
more than one week are expelled (e.g. Sodinokibi). 
The business-type nature of ransomware attackers 
is also demonstrated in their engagement in online 
public relations activities. Some ransomware groups 
conduct their own information campaigns to advance 
their goals. The Maze ransomware group for example 
released a statement on their website claiming that 
they would ‘spare’ healthcare organisations during 
the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. This turned out to be 
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disinformation, as the group allegedly attacked an 
urgent care centre in Texas soon after their release 
(refusing to pay ransom, Maze continued to publicise 
stolen patient data)28. The Maze group was also 
allegedly behind an attack on the Hammersmith 
Medicines Research facility in the UK, who have been 
involved in developing vaccines for the COVID-19 
virus29. 
Both Member States and private sector respondents 
have noticed an increase in subcontracting and 
cooperation among threat actors, which has improved 
their capabilities. Similarities in how criminals 
behind the trio Ryuk ransomware, Trickbot and 
Emotet malware operate suggests that criminals 
across different attack approaches could either 
belong to the same overall structure, or that they 
are becoming smarter at cooperating with each 
other. Well-organised criminal groups who engage in 
ransomware, have been observed by European law 
enforcement cooperating over malware, infrastructure 
and money laundering activities. The relationship 
between Emotet, Ryuk and Trickbot is considered one 
of the most notable in the cybercrime world.
Some ransomware actors have also grown more 
cautious. Member States and private sector 
respondents reported that some of the actors behind 
ransomware attacks have become less vocal on 
underground forums, setting up alerts and alarms. 
They have also been observed using additional 
VPN layers and cryptocurrencies with mixers and 
swappers to hide their tracks. According to European 
law enforcement, attackers have also found a way 
of using C&C servers when deploying malware to 
place the payload into the memory of the company’s 
servers. This way there is no trace on the victim’s 
hard disk and no way of recreating it once it is gone 
from memory. The IOCTA 2018 and 2019 include a 
section on file-less malware as an emerging threat in 
cyber-dependent crime, and the IOCTA 2018 included 
a forecast that file-less malware would become an 
increasingly standard component of CaaS offerings by 
2023.
Ransomware remains an under-reported 
crime
Several law enforcement authorities mentioned 
identifying ransomware cases through (local) 
media and approaching victims to assist them by 
potentially starting a criminal investigation. This was 
not generally a priority of the victim organisation, as 
the primary focus was on business continuity and 
limiting reputational damage (see Chapter 1). The 
shift in ransomware targeting individual PCs to more 
high-value targets such as businesses and public 
sector organisations introduces unique challenges 
to law enforcement investigations. Private and public 
sector victims of ransomware are disproportionately 
more affected by the threat of leaking data compared 
to ransomware cases in which PCs and individual 
persons were affected. Negative publicity leading to 
reputational fallout may lead to re-victimisation, which 
may prevent victims from coming forward to law 
enforcement authorities with information which could 
be crucial in identifying and catching the perpetrators. 
Victims prefer to engage with private sector security 
firms for investigating the attack or negotiating with 
the extortionists to manage the crises triggered by 
ransomware (some IT security firms hire specialist 
negotiators, some of whom get discounts from 
organised crime groups). Some of the companies 
that negotiate the ransom payment are working on 
the edge of legality, as they have developed a trusted 
business relationship with the ransomware actors. 
Companies are normally referenced by cybercriminals 
in their negotiations as a proof or ledger that the 
victim’s data will be decrypted after the ransom 
payment. Some of these companies negotiate behind 
the scenes with the ransomware actors to obtain 
a bigger discount from the ransom payment. Other 
companies might reflect this discount in the victim’s 
invoice, others may not. Cyber actors provide ransom 
discounts to victims if they use the services of specific 
companies. By using such companies, victims will 
not file an official complaint, which increases the lack 
of visibility and awareness concerning real figures of 
ransomware attacks among law enforcement. Not 
reporting cases to law enforcement agencies will 
obviously hamper any efforts, as important evidence 
and intelligence from different cases can be missed.
Furthermore, a case involving personal computers 
being targeted by ransomware shows that victims 
had opted to purchase new machines rather than 
report the event to law enforcement. Here victims 
were stunned when they were contacted by law 
enforcement over the ransomware attacks, and were 
under the impression that law enforcement would not 
do anything about the situation.
2.3 MALWARE
Besides ransomware, European law enforcement 
reported malware in the broader sense to be 
widely present in cybercrime cases. Criminals 
have converted some traditional banking Trojans 
into modular malware to cover a broader scope 
of collection of PC digital fingerprints collection 
and are being sold to cover different needs (e.g. 
droppers, exfiltration, etc.). These advanced forms 
of modular malware are a top threat in the EU. 
According to European law enforcement, incidents 
have been steadily increasing over the past year 
and are likely to rise significantly later in 2020. 
Malware typically includes Trojans and remote 
access tools (RATs), which allow criminals to gain 
remote control over infected computers. Some 
threat actors use techniques similar to those in the 
past in some cases resurrecting old exploit codes 
when taking advantage of hygiene security issues, 
such as the targeting of unpatched structured 
query language (SQL) vulnerabilities, making 
traditional attack methods still worthwhile. 
The level of complexity varies across malware 
attacks. Several groups have proven more adaptive 
and capable than others. Some groups can utilise 
malware to attack higher value targets with a 
more targeted approach, performing research and 
reconnaissance on their victims, whereas other 
less experienced actors engage in lower impact, 
massive attacks. 
Malware attacks have been targeting 
third-party providers
Malware attacks on organisations that play 
a crucial role in the supply chains of major 
organisations have been a significant development 
over the past year. Similarly, with ransomware, 
other forms of malware targeting third-party or 
outsourced service providers put supply chains 
at significant risk, as the impacts of such attacks 
could involve data leaks or major disruptions, as 
well as knock-on or cascading effects. Private 
sector respondents reported a growing number of 
attacks on third-party service providers; however, it 
is unclear whether attackers intended to impact the 
supply chain in all cases.
Ransomware case example 
Criminals targeted a London-based 
foreign currency exchange Travelex 
with Sodinokibi ransomware in the first 
weeks of 2020. The company had over 
1 000 stores and 1 000 ATMs in over 26 
countries. Travelex was also a third-party 
service provider for several well-known 
financial institutions internationally. 
As the attack left Travelex’s services 
disrupted for several weeks, this had 
varying impacts across the whole 
supply chain. The criminals encrypted 
Travelex’s data and allegedly managed 
to exfiltrate five gigabytes of sensitive 
data from Travelex, including personal 
data, social security numbers, dates 
of birth and payment card information, 
which it subsequently threatened to make 
public if Travelex did not pay the ransom. 
The company managed to restore 
its operations soon after, but it was 
reported that Travelex paid the USD 2.3 
million ransom to the attackers. It is not 
advisable for victims to pay the ransom, 
as there is no guarantee the victim will 
gain their data back nor that similar 
attacks will not happen in the future.
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In one case, a private sector respondent reported 
one of their third-party service providers had been 
targeted by Emotet malware which led to a high-
risk situation at the respondent’s organisation. 
Attackers were studying old email threads between 
the targeted company and the respondent carefully, 
trying to embed themselves into the conversation 
naturally using highly tailored messages to gather 
information. Staff at the respondent’s organisation 
grew suspicious when new names and email 
addresses were following up on months old 
threads, and so they reported the messages as 
suspicious. This case shows that threat actors put 
considerable effort and preparation into an attack. 
Emotet leads the way as the benchmark 
of modern malware as malware variants 
evolve
The evolution of Emotet and Trickbot malware 
shows how adaptive the malware threat is. The 
Emotet banking Trojan – which is mentioned as 
the top malware threat affecting the EU by both 
Member States and private sector respondents 
– has been used by cybercriminals to deliver 
other malicious malware payloads such as Ryuk 
ransomware and Trickbot. The developers behind 
Trickbot added a ‘Trickbooster botnet’ (a spam 
booster) to the malware. These developments 
signal an evolution in the malware and their 
capabilities. 
European law enforcement case 
study 
European law enforcement have 
witnessed some perpetrators using 
trusted third-party services in their 
malware attacks, including Amazon 
Web Cloud and Google Drive. The most 
downloaded PowerShell scripts are online 
text paste tools, such as Pastebin. These 
scripts are then executed in memory, 
making forensic analysis more difficult 
(what is known as file-less malware). 
Using phishing emails or malware 
payloads, threat actors are using the 
legitimacy of these services to trick 
their users. While this modus operandi 
has been around for a few years already, 
2019 saw a significant development. 
Cybercriminals hack legitimate sites 
(for example those run on WordPress) 
to house various payloads and malware, 
using them as ‘stagers’ to upload malware 
and phishing sites within them.
Emotet is highly professional and aggressive as 
it seeks to maximise its profits. Private sector 
respondents suggest Emotet is a benchmark for 
modern malware with over 200 000 unique versions 
observed globally. The group behind Emotet seems 
to take long breaks over the summer and when they 
return in the autumn, they become highly active 
again. Other top malware threats affecting Europe as 
reported by private sector respondents include Lokibot, 
which stores login credential information from web 
browsers and data related to cryptocurrency wallets, 
and Qakbot, another modular banking Trojan known 
to facilitate ransomware infections on corporate 
networks.
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Crime-as-a-Service (CaaS) enhances reach 
of attacks 
Prolific malware, which criminals turn into commodity 
malware for others to use, is cause for concern. 
Threat actors collude with one another by sharing 
infrastructure, services and compromised credentials. 
Commodity malware and Malware-as-a-Service 
(MaaS) lower barriers for threat actors wanting to 
engage in cyber-attacks. 
Despite a substantial decrease in exploit kits on 
underground markets, prolific malware such as 
Emotet and Trickbot have successfully filled the void. 
Both Emotet and Trickbot use modular structures 
to enable reselling and renting sections of their 
malware to their rivals without compromising their key 
differentiators. “TrickBot likely is operated by a single 
group as a MaaS platform that caters to a relatively 
small number of top-tier cybercriminals. Available 
information leads us to believe that individual TrickBot 
campaigns can be attributed to these different 
customers using the group tag parameter, and each 
customer may bring their own tactics, techniques and 
procedures and engage in highly targeted attacks30.”  
By doing the heavy lifting in acquiring access to a 
target’s systems, Emotet can provide Access-as-a-
Service (AaaS) to other cybercriminals. These other 
criminals can focus on monetising the opportunity 
with some other second stage malware. Competing 
solutions for electronic skimming (e-skimming) and 
JavaScript skimmers, with varying capabilities, each 
with the goal of compromising online merchant 
websites by harvesting payment card data, have 
also been offered as a service on the Darkweb by 
cybercriminals. These will be elaborated further in 
Chapter 4. 
Simultaneously, European law enforcement has 
reported a rise in less tech-savvy cybercriminals in 
the context of widely available CaaS solutions. There 
has been an observable shift from what used to be 
a business for threat actors, now being more of an 
enterprise. Where specialist skills are needed (e.g. 
malware-coding, malware-distribution), criminals are 
able to hire developers or consultants to fill this need. 
This highlights increased professionalisation in the 
cybercrime threat landscape.
Through using combination attacks, criminals 
effectively challenge law enforcement’s capacity to 
investigate incidents and attribute attacks to specific 
perpetrators and crime groups. Malware combinations 
add layers of complexity to law enforcement 
investigations.  Encryption also presents a challenge, 
as malware developers often use encryption to 
frustrate law enforcement and industry efforts in 
analysing the functionality of malware and assign 
attribution to specific crime groups.
Mobile malware remain relatively stable
As more and more cashless payment transactions 
have emerged in the mobile scene, mobile threats 
such as mobile malware targeting cashless payment 
methods continue to grow. Mobile malware has 
yet to reach scalability as a sustainable business 
for cybercriminals, at least when contrasted with 
traditional banking Trojans. This is likely due to 
the limited transactions (with a cap typically set at 
around €50) which are enabled with mobile payments. 
Launching mobile malware attacks requires significant 
effort compared to other attack varieties which 
further offer larger payouts, which means they are 
likely conducted by less funded, amateur actors. 
European law enforcement also detected first signs 
of mobile payment fraud with attempted fraudulent 
transactions using app-based systems. Investigations 
are underway and it is unclear currently whether this 
involved mobile malware.
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2.4 DDoS
In 2019, the DDoS attack celebrated its 20th 
anniversary. Ongoing investigations show that the 
DDoS threat is still prevalent in the cyber landscape. 
However, this topic has also had several success 
stories in prevention, mitigation and investigation. 
Attackers have adapted to these security measures 
by using attacks more efficiently, using both new tools 
and reigniting old techniques, and targeting more 
vulnerable victims. 
Different types of attacks witnessed
Private sector and Member States respondents 
observed several phenomena relating to DDoS 
attacks over the past year. Private sector respondents 
reported seeing an increase in massive and simple 
DDoS attacks. European law enforcement did not 
witness significantly impactful attacks in 2019 but 
reported two kinds of attacks: targeted attacks which 
aim to damage specific industries or information 
systems; and crimes using automated tools. 
Automated attacks have been growing over the past 
year and are likely connected to CaaS. Threat actors 
can purchase pre-existing automated tools and deploy 
them for their own purpose, which makes conducting 
a DDoS attack a relatively cheap and easy way of 
carrying out an attack for threat actors who may have 
limited skills or experience in engaging in cybercrime. 
Moreover, criminals can use DDoS as a decoy or 
smokescreen for a more targeted attack. 
Additionally, old DDoS methods are still prevalent. 
European law enforcement observed attacks 
targeting telecommunications and technology firms, 
where, in some cases, DDoS attackers threatened 
companies with reputational harm and extorted them 
for payment. Law enforcement agencies also came 
across cases where threat actors engaged in small 
attacks against larger organisations, extorting them 
for money with the threat of conducting larger attacks. 
Some threat actors targeted public systems and 
websites with DDoS attacks, however, these attacks 
were difficult to attribute to anyone specifically. One 
reason for the change in DDoS attacks could be the 
increase in protective measures used by organisations 
against them. 
With respect to 2020, Amazon said its Amazon Web 
Services Shield service mitigated the largest DDoS 
attack ever recorded, stopping at 2.3 terabyte attack in 
February 202031.  
Law enforcement case study
Law enforcement caught wind of a 
DDoS attack targeting a Finnish-based 
company. When approached by law 
enforcement, however, the company did 
not agree with the assessment, denying 
they were under attack. The attackers 
had used network mirroring DDoS via 
the Finnish company to amplify their 
attack on a major casino service in 
Southern Europe, which was the real 
target of the attack. Law enforcement 
thought that the Finnish company was 
the target, however attackers were only 
utilising the company’s large network 
for mirroring and thus adding more 
volume to their actual DDoS attack. 
This is an old technique which has 
resurfaced after a few years, however 
with increased volume and capabilities. 
European law enforcement observed a 
couple of these cases.
DDoS has become increasingly adaptive 
Cybercriminals who engage in DDoS attacks have 
adapted against increasingly robust protection 
measures. Instead of targeting high-value targets 
with massive volume attacks, attackers have shifted 
their focus on smaller organisations with less mature 
security apparatus. Downscaling their targets enable 
attackers to utilise volume more efficiently, and ensure 
maximum payout when the attacks are financially 
motivated. For example, private sector respondents 
reported smaller volume attacks which are capable 
of blocking smaller data centres. Small requests from 
700 IP addresses make it difficult to block against a 
DDoS attack, and difficult for investigators to trace 
the attacker responsible as the attack comes from 
multiple IP addresses. These attacks incorporated 
additional methods which allowed the attackers to 
bypass the firewall’s operational capacity.
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IoT and DDoS
Connected devices, also known as the Internet of 
Things (IoT), are an additional avenue for DDoS 
attacks. According to private sector respondents, 
connected devices which run on legacy operating 
systems or which have weak or non-existent 
password protection could be vulnerable to DDoS 
attacks or for criminals wanting to provide DDoS 
services for other criminals, particularly as connected 
devices could be used for lateral movement to 
infiltrate networks. Private sector respondents also 
observed IoT botnets emerging, and while these have 
been mostly experimental, not yet witnessed in use for 
specific scenarios, criminals may advertise these for 
DDoS attacks.
The threat potential of DDoS attacks is 
higher than its current impact in the EU
Private sector respondents raised the concern 
of threat actors targeting third-party service 
providers with their attacks, for example energy and 
telecommunication providers. If attackers managed to 
bring down organisations in these sectors, criminals 
could potentially gain access to other valuable targets. 
Third-party service provider targeting could have 
other significant knock-on and cascading impacts 
in the supply chain. For example, the high level of 
interconnectivity in the financial industry also makes it 
vulnerable to disruptions.
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 KEY FINDINGS
 • The amount of online 
CSAM detected continues 
to increase, further 
exacerbated by the 
COVID-19 crisis, which has 
serious consequences 
for the capacity of law 
enforcement authorities.
 • The use of encrypted 
chat apps and industry 
proposals to expand that 
market, pose a substantial 
risk for abuse and make 
it more difficult for law 
enforcement to detect and 
investigate  online CSE 
activities.
 • Online offender 
communities exhibit 
considerable resilience and 
are continuously evolving. 
 • Livestreaming of child 
sexual abuse continues 
to increase and became 
even more prevalent  during 
the COVID-19 crisis, a 
recent case shows CSAM 
production also takes place 
in the EU.
 • The commercialisation of 
online CSE is becoming a 
more widespread issue.
Child sexual exploitation online3  C R I M E  P R I O R I T Y 
The main threats related to online CSE have 
remained relatively stable over recent years 
and throughout 2019. However, the COVID-19 
pandemic has somewhat shifted this 
assessment. Detection of online CSAM was 
already increasing on a year-to-year basis, but 
saw a sharp spike during the peak of the crisis.  
A surge in the exchange of online CSAM occurred 
during the contact and travel restrictions and 
the consequences of this may have a long-term 
impact on CSE in general.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
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3.2 THE AMOUNT OF ONLINE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE MATERIAL 
CONTINUES TO INCREASE
The year-on-year increase of detected online CSAM 
has continued. Law enforcement authorities in the 
EU see themselves confronted with an overwhelming 
amount of online CSAM to the extent that it becomes 
unmanageable for many of the units dealing with 
this crime. This includes regular complaints requiring 
investigation, including production of CSAM through 
rape and sexual assault, possession of that material, 
grooming, sexual coercion and extortion, but also 
referrals from the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children (NCMEC), ISPs, and hotline 
reports. This ongoing increase reflects a continuous 
distribution and redistribution of CSAM content. The 
effect of this on victims is significant and ongoing32. 
An international survey carried out by the Canadian 
Centre for Child Protection revealed that 70% of 
victims feared being recognised in public as a result of 
their involuntary participation in the offences against 
them33.
The COVID-19 crisis revealed an extra surge in online 
distribution of CSAM. Referrals from the public, and 
industry in third-party countries reached record highs 
during the peak months of the pandemic. EU Member 
States also reported an increase in the number of 
blocked attempts to access websites featuring CSAM 
during their lockdowns. Moreover, several EU Member 
States have reported an increase in detected CSAM 
activity on Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks especially 
in the second half of March, when lockdowns in EU 
Member States started materialising34.  
The increase in online CSAM has serious 
consequences for the capacity of law enforcement 
authorities to follow up and investigate reports of 
online CSE. Many investigators in EU Member States 
are faced on a daily basis with the task of making 
impossible choices between investigating one report 
instead of another. 
There might be several reasons behind the growing 
amount of detected CSAM, including more offenders 
or better detection mechanisms. At least some of 
the CSAM is being repeatedly uploaded and widely 
distributed. However, the harm resulting from being a 
victim of this is severe, as victims experience repeat 
victimisation every time a picture or video is shared35.  
One of the drivers of the continuous growth of 
online CSAM is the growth in self-produced material. 
Especially during COVID-19 related lockdowns, 
children spent more time online, sharing images 
and videos that subsequently ended up with CSE 
offenders. 
Reports from the 
public




offenders about online 
activity of children
Attempts to initiate 
online contact with 
children
Volume of new posts in 
online forums
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Offenders keep using a number of ways to disguise 
online CSAM, making it more complicated for law 
enforcement authorities to detect such images 
and videos. Although P2P network sharing remains 
among the most popular ways for perpetrators 
to share CSAM, it appears to be declining in 
popularity. The use of proactive EMPACT preventive 
and educative campaigns such as Police2Peer36 
seem to have had a continuing impact on 
reducing demand through these networks over 
time. One-to-one distribution and sharing among 
larger groups routinely takes place on social 
networking platforms and widely used encrypted 
communication applications such as WhatsApp, 
a trend reflected by the increasing number of 
referrals from US service providers via NCMEC37.
Increased encryption of many digital communi-
cation channels means it is becoming more and 
more challenging for law enforcement agencies to 
investigate these crimes. There is increased activity 
on encrypted communication platforms beyond Tor, 
making it difficult to detect and investigate online 
CSE activities, including the creation and distribu-
tion of material, online grooming, sexual coercion 
and extortion.
Perpetrators have been using encrypted communi-
cations for a long time, but now even less tech-sav-
vy offenders can easily use encryption. While the 
development of encrypted messaging platforms 
is not something bad in itself, it does raise signifi-
cant obstacles for investigations in this crime type. 
Additionally, the conversion of popular unencrypted 
chat applications to encrypted status poses a sub-
stantial risk of increased abuse of those platforms 
for the exchange of CSAM and communication 
between offenders38. Several platforms including 
Facebook have reported a significant amount of 
CSAM. If these platforms move to implement end-
to-end encryption for their messenger, concerns will 
rise over their continued ability to identify CSAM on 
their own platforms.
International police cooperation 
leads to the arrest of a Darkweb 
child sex abuser in Spain 
The operation to bring down a child sex 
abuser, who had made explicit videos of 
an underage boy, owes its success to 
international cooperation. Information 
from Queensland Police – Australia’s 
Taskforce Argos sent via Europol’s secure 
communication channel – allowed Europol 
experts to carry out operational analysis, 
which revealed that a video from 2015 
found in Belgium and France may have 
been filmed in Spain.
The analysis of the images and video – 
which showed how the suspect abused a 
boy who was under five years old at the 
time – led the Spanish National Police to 
locate the suspect. When looking into the 
message published with the video, officers 
noticed that the suspect used words and 
phrases from Spain and not from a Latin 
American country.
Using operational analysis, open-source 
enquiries and cross-checking information, 
Europol experts found that the suspect 
was registered on several websites and 
boards dedicated to child sexual abuse 
and exploitation on the Darkweb. The 
investigation revealed that the suspect 
was also using a social media network 
where he was in touch with a woman who 
shared the same surname as the one in the 
title of the sexual abuse video.
Once the abuser was located in Barcelona, 
cybercrime experts from the Spanish 
National Police Central High-Tech Crime 
Unit located in Madrid moved to Barcelona. 
Due to the lockdown in Spain, they were 
assisted remotely by other experts in 
Madrid. The material seized showed how 
the arrested suspect was using several 
email addresses and Darkweb access 
points to commit this crime39.
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3.4 DARKWEB OFFENDER COMMUNITIES ARE 
CONTINUOUSLY EVOLVING
Online offender communities exhibit considerable 
resilience in response to operational activities 
carried out by law enforcement agencies, attacks by 
unidentified actors and losses of staff and platforms.  
Their reactions include resurrecting old communities, 
establishing new communities, and making strong 
efforts to organise and administer them. 
Parallel to the activity of large offender communities 
through Darknet forums is a development involving 
smaller communities sharing CSAM directly with each 
other via encrypted messaging platforms. Following 
several high-profile law enforcement operations on 
the Darkweb, many offenders seem to believe they 
are more secure in such small networks, sometimes 
based on invite-only. Offenders are also known to have 
used encrypted communication channels to infiltrate 
existing child-aged groups and form break-off groups 
involving children and adults40.   
In response to law enforcement operations targeting 
these Darkweb communities and due to the need 
to select participants and ensure exchanges of 
information are strictly related to child sexual abuse, 
offenders tightly control their communities. They 
use Darkweb forums as meeting places where 
participation is structured similarly to criminal 
organisations, with affiliation rules, codes of conduct, 
division of tasks and strict hierarchies. The purpose 
of the structure is to enforce rules and promote 
individuals based on their contribution to the 
community, which they do by recording and posting 
their abuse of children, encouraging others to abuse 
and providing like-minded, technical and practical 
support to one another.
Administrators require strict observance of the rules 
to avoid being banned from the forum. In addition, 
compliance with the rules and active participation can 
lead to a progressive increase in rank. Users regularly 
publish information and safety manuals aimed at 
avoiding detection by law enforcement authorities. 
Some users are also attentive to law enforcement 
operations and regularly publish news articles or 
even summary reports of the techniques used during 
successful operations. Cross-posting of such advice 
across various boards and forums highlights a 
collective approach to improve operational security 
for all. Some of these communities also meet offline, 
sometimes travelling great distances and bringing 
physical hard drives as storage media with them. 
Whereas Darkweb communities and real-life child 
sexual abusers used to be relatively separate, there 
appear to be more hands-on abusers – including 
individuals travelling for live distant child abuse 
– who are also very active on the Darkweb. Some 
law enforcement agencies have had cases where 
offenders keep material they produced themselves 
with them for many years before uploading it to 
the internet, hoping to avoid victim identification. 
This illustrates the crucial importance of victim 
identification efforts by law enforcement agencies, 
such as the Victim Identification Taskforce (VIDTF) 
organised on a regular basis by Europol.
DARKWEB
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Ninety suspects identified in major 
online child sexual abuse operation
Police around the world have taken down a 
global child abuse ring with links to over forty 
countries through a Belgian investigation 
supported by Europol. Four suspects have 
been convicted by a Belgian court.
This case was sparked by the Belgian East 
Flanders Federal Judicial Police, after more 
than nine million pictures and videos of the 
abuse of thousands of children from around 
the world were found there during a house 
search.
The vast majority of this footage had never 
been seen in circulation before by law 
enforcement. Suspecting they were producing 
their own, the Belgian investigators launched 
operation Gargamel together with Europol 
across Europe and beyond. The image and 
video data seized during this investigation 
has been used for Victim Identification Task 
Forces hosted by Europol, through which 
seventy children and thirty suspects have 
been identified. The Belgian Federal Judicial 
Police succeeded in identifying 60 suspects 
(of which 24 in Belgium) and 40 victims, which 
brings the actual total to ninety suspects and 
110 victims. 
Some suspects have already appeared 
before court in a number of other countries. 
In Australia, a suspect was sentenced to 15 
years in prison.
More arrests and rescues are expected 
globally as police in over 40 countries 
examine the intelligence packages compiled 
by Europol and information from the Belgian 
Federal Judicial Police43.
3.5 LIVESTREAMING IS BECOMING MAINSTREAM
Livestreaming of child sexual abuse continues to 
increase, becoming even more popular than usual 
during the COVID-19 crisis, when travel restrictions 
prevented offenders from physically abusing 
children41. As offenders had fewer opportunities to 
engage in physical CSE, live streaming emerged as 
a viable alternative to hands-on child sexual abuse. 
In some cases, video chat applications with built-in 
payment systems are used. This is a complicated area 
for law enforcement investigations, as usually none 
of the material is recorded, except for occasional chat 
conversations. 
The Philippines remains the main country where 
live distant child abuse (LDCA) takes place. Cases 
of online CSE in the Philippines surged during the 
COVID-19 crisis, as the lockdown meant already poor 
families struggled to generate income and children 
did not go to school42. However, this year has further 
confirmed that this type of online CSE is not limited 
to Southeast Asian countries. A large operation in 
Romania uncovered significant levels of livestreaming 
taking place within the country, demonstrating that the 
EU is not immune to this threat.
In some cases, those seeking live streams of CSE are 
deceived: they pay for a live stream, but never receive 
anything.
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3.6 COMMERCIALISATION OF ONLINE CSE IS AN 
EMERGING THREAT
Last year’s IOCTA reported that commercialisation of 
CSAM remained limited to LDCA44. However, the past 
year has brought to light a number of indications that 
the commercialisation of online CSE is becoming a 
more widespread issue. For a long time, online CSE 
was one of the few crime areas Europol focused 
on that was not primarily driven by financial gain. 
Although offenders are still primarily driven by a 
desire to obtain more CSAM, in some cases they do 
seek to profit from online CSE. The emergence of a 
profit-driven model in this crime area is a worrisome 
development.
The monetisation of content has been seen on both 
the Clearnet and the Darknet, with many links on the 
dark web referring to Clearnet resources. Individuals 
monetise CSAM by uploading material to hosting 
sites (including legitimate hosting services) and 
subsequently acquiring credit on the basis of the 
number of downloads. This credit can be used to pay 
for additional hosting or in some instances can be 
cashed out, either in cryptocurrencies or other means. 
LDCA has had a commercial element for a longer 
time, as offenders frequently pay to watch parents, 
carers and offenders abuse children remotely to order. 
Uploading CSAM to legitimate hosting services is 
another method of monetising CSAM. The platform 
used to download this material may not be aware of 
the content or can claim not to be aware. The hosting 
site’s advertising and the potential profits per click are 
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3.7 ONLINE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE TO REMAIN 
SIGNIFICANT THREAT
Online child sexual abuse remains a significant 
threat. The situation with COVID-19 has increased 
the time people spend online, whether it is for remote 
working, remote schooling or spare time. Children 
who spend a lot of time online unsupervised are 
therefore much more exposed to potential offenders 
through online gaming, the use of chat groups in apps, 
phishing attempts via email, unsolicited contact on 
social media as well as through less secure online 
educational applications45. Additionally, unsupervised 
time online further increases the risk of producing and 
distributing self-generated indecent material among 
underage individuals, which could also eventually 
reach child sex offenders. Furthermore, child sex 
offenders could take advantage of lonely and isolated 
children online, connecting with them to produce 
explicit material or to arrange a meeting in real life46. 
The current situation regarding COVID-19 creates 
considerable levels of uncertainty and unpredictability 
for the foreseeable future. The developments 
around the pandemic and related lockdowns and 
travel restrictions will have a big influence on the 
developments regarding online CSE.
The growth in CSAM being detected is showing no 
signs of stabilising, let alone decreasing. The end of the 
current health crisis and the lifting of lockdown measures 
may result in an increased number of reports of CSE, 
as abuse that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic 
may be reported to law enforcement or other authorities 
after the fact. It is highly likely that in the upcoming 
year there will be a sharp increase in the amount of 
self-produced indecent material, which might also lead 
to a corresponding increase in online solicitation and 
exploitation.
Travel restrictions and other measures during the 
pandemic have likely prevented offenders from travelling 
and so have shifted their focus further to the exchange 
of CSAM online. A relaxation of travel restrictions and 
opening up of air travel will likely lead to an increase 
in transnational offenders seeking out CSE in certain 
countries and regions. If air travel remains limited for the 
foreseeable future however, or becomes more expensive, 
it is also possible we will see an increase in proxy 
offending both with surrogates such as childlike sex dolls 
or via live streaming. 
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 KEY FINDINGS
 • SIM swapping is a 
key trend that allows 
perpetrators to take 
over accounts and has 
demonstrated a steep rise 
over the last year.
 • BEC remains area of 
concern as it has increased, 
grown in sophistication, 
and become more targeted.
 • Many law enforcement 
agencies and financial 
services identified online 
investment fraud as one 
of the fastest-growing 
crimes, generating millions 
of losses and affecting 
thousands of victims from 
all EU countries.
 • CNP fraud continues to 
increase as criminals 
diversify in terms of target 
sectors and e-skimming 
modi operandi.
Payment fraud4  C R I M E  P R I O R I T Y 
While the majority of fraud types are well known, 
they enjoy continued success due to insufficient 
cybersecurity measures and an overall lack of 
awareness. Fuelled by a wealth of readily available 
data, as well as a CaaS community, it has become 
easier for criminals to carry out attacks. As a 
result, law enforcement and industry continue to 
identify well-established frauds such as BEC, as 
a major threat but also witnessed new key trends 
such as SIM swapping emerge.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
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4.2 INCREASE IN SIM SWAPPING AND SMISHING
SIM swapping is one of the new key trends in 
this year’s IOCTA. This modus operandi garnered 
considerable attention over the past twelve months, 
as law enforcement agencies noticed a significant 
increase with a growing number of cases in Europe. 
SIM swapping is a type of account takeover and 
refers to the circumvention of SMS-based 2FA to 
access sensitive user accounts. Criminals fraudulently 
swap or port the victim’s SIM to one in the criminal’s 
possession in order to intercept the one time 
password (OTP) step of the authentication process. 
Since this typically requires detailed information on 
the victim, SIM swapping attacks are highly targeted. 
This also means that the overall volume of cases 
differs from Member State to Member State, leading 
to SIM swapping cases causing significantly higher 
losses in some jurisdictions while it is barely present 
in others.
Overall, SIM swapping poses a significant concern 
and huge potential danger and risk. A successful 
SIM swapping attack can lead to criminals gaining 
complete control over a victim’s bank, email or social 
media account, and as a result, enable a number of 
serious follow-up crimes.
Operation Quinientos Dusim47
In January 2020, investigators from the 
Spanish National Police together with 
the Civil Guard and Europol targeted 
suspects across Spain believed to be 
part of a hacking ring which stole over 
€3 million in a series of SIM swapping 
attacks. Law enforcement arrested 12 
individuals in Benidorm (5), Granada (6) 
and Valladolid (1).
Composed of nationals between the 
ages of 22 and 52 years old from Italy, 
Romania, Colombia and Spain, this 
criminal gang struck over 100 times, 
stealing between €6 000 and €137 000 
from bank accounts of unsuspecting 
victims per attack.
The modus operandi was simple, yet 
effective. The criminals managed to 
obtain the online banking credentials 
from the victims of the different banks 
by through the use of banking Trojans or 
other types of malware. Once they had 
these credentials, the suspects would 
apply for a duplicate of the SIM cards of 
the victims, providing fake documents 
to the mobile service providers. With 
these duplicates in their possession, they 
would receive the 2FA codes directly 
to their phones send by the banks to 
confirm the transfers.
The criminals then proceeded to make 
fraudulent transfers from the victims’ 
accounts to money mule accounts used 
to hide their traces. All this was done 
in a very short period – between one or 
two hours – which is the time it would 
take for the victim to realise that his/her 
phone number was no longer working.
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Similar to SIM swapping, SMishing 
has seen an increase over the past 
twelve months. SMishing refers 
to the sending of fraudulent text 
messages purporting to be from 
trusted senders, typically targeting 
financial institutions and their 
customers.
SMishing is a lucrative alternative to 
phishing by email for a number of 
reasons. As most bank customers 
receive the advice to be suspicious 
of emails, customers do not yet have 
the same level of scepticism towards 
potentially fraudulent text messages. 
In addition, it is difficult to impossible 
for banks to protect their customers 
from SMishing attacks, as criminals 
aim to abuse the Alpha Tag of the 
SMS thread and Signaling System 7 
(SS7) vulnerabilities.
Operation Smart Cash48
An eight-month-long investigation between 
the Romanian National Police and the 
Austrian Criminal Intelligence Service with 
the support of Europol has led to the arrest 
of 14 members of a crime gang who emptied 
bank accounts in Austria by gaining control 
over their victims’ phone numbers. 
Law enforcement arrested the suspects 
earlier in February in Romania in 
simultaneous warrants at their homes in 
Bucharest (1), Constanta (5), Mures (6), Braila 
(1) and Sibiu (1). 
The gang perpetrated the thefts, which netted 
dozens of victims in Austria, in the spring of 
2019 in a series of SIM swapping attacks. 
Once having gained control over a victim’s 
phone number, this particular gang would 
then use stolen banking credentials to 
log onto a mobile banking application to 
introduce a withdrawal which they then 
validated with an OTP sent by the bank via 
SMS allowing them to withdraw money at 
cardless ATMs.
It is estimated that this gang managed to 
steal over half a million euros this way from 
unsuspecting bank account owners.
SIM swapping occurs when a fraudster, using 
social engineering techniques, takes control 
over your mobile phone SIM card using your 
stolen personal data.
SIM SWAPPING – A MOBILE PHONE SCAM
Keep your software updated, including your 
browser, antivirus and operating system. 
Restrict information and show caution with 
regard to social media.
Never open suspicious links or 
attachments received by email or text 
message.
Do not reply to suspicious emails or 
engage over the phone with callers that 
request your personal information. 
Update your passwords regularly.
WHAT CAN YOU DO?
ARE YOU A VICTIM?
A fraudster obtains the victim’s personal data 
through e.g. data breaches, phishing, social 
media searches, malicious apps, online 
shopping, malware, etc. 
Buy from trusted sources. Check the ratings 
of individual sellers.
Download apps only from official providers 
and always read the apps permissions.
When possible, do not associate your phone 
number with sensitive online accounts.
Set up your own PIN to restrict access to the 
SIM card. Do not share this PIN with anyone. 
Frequently check your financial statements. 
If your mobile phone loses reception 
for no reason, report it immediately 
to your service provider. 
HOW DOES IT WORK?
ID CARD
With this information, the fraudster dupes the 
mobile phone operator into porting the victim's 
mobile number to a SIM in his possession
The fraudster can now 
receive incoming calls and 
text messages, including 
access to the victim’s online 
banking
The victim will notice the mobile 
phone lost service, and eventually 
will discover they cannot log in to 
their bank account
If your service provider confirms 
that your SIM has been swapped, 
report it to the police.
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4.3 BUSINESS EMAIL COMPROMISE REMAINS A THREAT AND 
GROWING AREA OF CONCERN
BEC remains a main and further growing threat 
for law enforcement and private industry. BEC is 
a sophisticated scam targeting businesses and 
organisations, whereby criminals employ social 
engineering techniques to gain access to an 
employee’s or executive’s email account to initiate 
bank transfers under fraudulent conditions, i.e. by 
pretending to be the CEO and asking the employee to 
carry out a payment.
BEC causes enormous losses and disruption to 
livelihoods and business operations49. Often following 
spear phishing emails, BEC is highly tailored and very 
effective with targets ranging from governments, 
international organisations, small to large businesses 
and individuals.
The two most common types of BEC are CEO fraud 
(criminals impersonating a high-level executive 
requesting urgent bank transfers) and invoice 
fraud (criminals impersonating suppliers asking 
for legitimate payments to be directed to a bank 
account under the criminal’s control, or creating new, 
fraudulent invoices).
According to interviews with Member States, in many 
cases, BEC is carried out through a compromise 
of email accounts hosted by Office 365, access to 
which is typically gained through credential phishing 
in advance to the fraud. This is often possible due to 
limited security measures, such as a lack of 2FA; as 
well as a lack of awareness regarding spear phishing 
attempts. These type of attacks are still mostly 
Exploitation of 2FA behind smart ID
Three EU Member States reported cases of 
SMishing. Criminals used SMishing to bypass 
the 2FA mechanism offered by national 
smart IDs. Criminals aiming to attack bank 
accounts and the respective national banking 
infrastructure targeted these national Smart 
ID solutions through social engineering. 
Abusing alphanumeric SMS threads, criminals 
sent SMS appearing to come from the bank. 
These text messages prompted the recipients 
to log in to their online bank accounts using 
their smart ID, for instance to change their 
bank information. Following the link, they 
were then directed to fake bank log in account 
pages, which would verify a fraudulent 
transaction initiated by the criminal after they 
attempted to log in. Alternatively, threat actors 
would use this modus operandi to create 
a new Smart ID account under the victim’s 
name, but under full criminal control.
originating from Eastern Europe, Nigeria and other 
African countries. The most sophisticated threat 
actors come from Israel. 
BEC has increased, grown in sophistication, 
and become more targeted
Over the past twelve months, BEC has increased 
across most EU Member States, with an additional 
increase as a result of the global outbreak of 
COVID-19.  This increase in volume coincides with 
a growing sophistication and a more targeted 
approach. Criminals make use of technically advanced 
measures, such as compromising bank accounts, 
identifying the ideal time to strike, managing email 
conversations with complex man-in-the-middle 
attacks or even using Artificial Intelligence (AI) to 
mimic the voice of a company’s CEO50. The growing 
sophistication of BEC is also reflected in the 
establishment and use of complex criminal networks, 
which are used to launder the proceeds of the fraud. 
Additionally, criminals have become better at local 
languages and the exploitation of local contexts.  
While criminals target all kinds of organisations and 
businesses, there is an increased focus on smaller 
companies, rather than just large corporations. As 
a result, even cybersecurity companies not usually 
dealing with BEC have been receiving requests for 
technical assistance, for instance to conduct forensic 
investigations on the servers.
YOUR BANK 
Due to the new rules we need 
you to verify your bank account 
details. 
Please click here 
http://yourbank.eu to verify 
your details. 
Smishing (a combination of the words 
SMS and Phishing) is the attempt by 
fraudsters to acquire personal, 
financial or security information by 
text message. 
The text message will typically ask you to 
click on a link or call a phone number in order 
to ‘verify’, ‘update’ or ‘reactivate’ your account. 
But...the link leads to a bogus website and the 
phone number leads to a fraudster pretending 
to be the legitimate company. 
HOW DOES IT WORK?
WHAT CAN YOU DO?
Don’t click on links, attachments or images that you receive in unsolicited text 
messages without first verifying the sender.
Don’t be rushed. Take your time and make the appropriate checks before 
responding.
Never respond to a text message that requests your PIN or your online banking 
password or any other security credentials.
If you think you might have responded to a smishing text and provided your 
bank details, contact your bank immediately.
BANK SMISHING SMS
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Industry case study
One private sector partner 
reported a case in which a criminal 
impersonated its CEO while at a 
conference. The threat actor made 
initial contact through WhatsApp, 
using a spoofed ID account and 
picture of the CEO and subsequently 
sent a forged email from the CEO 
about an urgent acquisition. Using 
information taken from open sources, 
the attack was highly targeted and 
convincing, demonstrating detailed 
knowledge about the CEO’s current 
whereabouts. The fraud – the 
payment of an invoice, which never 
existed – was stopped only at the last 
moment, when a missing purchase 
order number raised a red flag.
Industry case study
A private sector partner reported a 
case in which a threat actor used 
social engineering and blended 
attacks to target the bank and its 
corporate clients simultaneously. The 
fraudster, having gained access to 
the client’s email network, contacted 
the bank to request a change of the 
client’s beneficiary account. The 
perpetrator subsequently managed 
the conversation and information 
exchange between the bank and the 
corporate client at the same time. 
Through this, the perpetrator showed 
a thorough understanding of the 
bank’s processes and knowledge of 
who to speak to in order to change 
the account.
Criminals likely to abuse voice biometrics 
In the future, law enforcement and industry expect to 
see an increased use of voice biometrics to commit 
impersonation fraud. While biometrics are currently 
working well, attempts to compromise them to get 
access to bank accounts for BEC are expected to 
proliferate as additional security measures are being 
implemented.
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4.4 ONLINE INVESTMENT FRAUD DRAWS IN VICTIMS 
ALL OVER EUROPE
Another relative ‘newcomer’ in this year’s IOCTA is 
online investment fraud. Many law enforcement 
agencies and financial services identified online 
investment fraud as one of the fastest-growing crimes 
of the past twelve months, generating millions of 
losses and affecting thousands of victims from all EU 
countries. Many Member States witnessed this type of 
fraud for the first time.
Online investment fraud refers to a fraud type whereby 
criminals aim to lure their victims into transferring 
them money with appealing get-rich-quick schemes. 
Offering commodities such as cryptocurrencies, 
diamonds, or gold, criminals promise victims 
extraordinary financial returns on their investments, 
while criminals keep victims engaged through 
websites showing fake investment returns. While 
online investment fraud usually accounts for mid-level 
money losses, some victims have lost their entire life 
savings before realising that they had fallen victim to 
a scam. 
Online investment fraud demonstrate high 
level of complexity 
A number of online investment fraud cases have 
shown a significant level of complexity, with large 
networks of shell companies and call centres behind 
these schemes, as well as the development of 
software and communication tactics to systematise 
the exploitation of victims to their last cent.
In some cases, criminals have asked victims to 
install RATs to take control over the target computer, 
to initiate money transfers to criminals through full 
control over the computer and bank account. In 
addition to eliciting money transfers from their victims, 
criminals have also been seen to combine this type of 
fraud with phishing and the theft of credentials to be 
used subsequently for additional fraud.
Criminals usually target victims through social media, 
using celebrities and fake versions of news outlets, 
or come across the fraudulent investment web sites 
via search engines. Criminals have also been seen 
employing blended social engineering, with a mix of 
SMishing, cold calling and other techniques. Often 
these targets include older victims, who are less 
technologically savvy.
Online investment fraud is difficult to investigate, as 
criminals set up complex international schemes of 
companies with legal appearance, spanning across 
several legal jurisdictions. The groups behind these 
schemes are difficult to identify, due in part to their 
use of anonymisation tools, spoofed phone numbers 
and legitimate-looking websites.
Given the fast rise of investment fraud in many EU 
Member States, law enforcement agencies expect this 
type of fraud is to continue to increase and appear in 
so far unaffected countries, too. Perpetrators generally 
seem to originate from Russia, Ukraine and other 
Eastern European countries
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4.5 CARD-NOT-PRESENT FRAUD CONTINUES TO 
INCREASE AS CRIMINALS DIVERSIFY
CNP fraud, such as carding and e-skimming, has 
increased over the past twelve months, with criminals 
shifting to new sectors and employing novel modi 
operandi.
Carding refers to the use of stolen card data to 
purchase goods or services. While carding has 
increased, criminals have moved away from targeting 
the airline industry towards the accommodation and 
rental sectors. The reduction in airline fraud is a direct 
result of successful public-private cooperation, which 
reduced the overall losses by nearly 50% and pushed 
criminals to other sectors. This is in addition to the 
purchase of goods such as mobile devices, phones 
and electronics, which criminals bring in from other 
countries using compromised card details.
Criminals take the stolen card details from dark web 
marketplaces (such as the Joker’s Stash51), which 
make it increasingly easy to obtain stolen credentials 
from specific forums. Since these Darkweb forums 
typically require payment or some kind of interaction 
in order to gain entry, access is often difficult for law 
enforcement to obtain.
Investigating carding on the dark 
web
During the Carding Action Week at 
the end of 2018, the Hungarian police 
launched an investigation into a vendor 
who was active on various markets 
offering card details from Hungarian 
cardholders.
The vendor was using different Pretty 
Good Privacy (PGP) public keys on 
the various market places but the 
police were able to decode these keys. 
This made it possible to identify the 
vendor’s primary e-mail address used for 
registration on these market places. 
During the investigation, the police 
were able to link the vendor’s activities 
offering 400 account details from various 
financial institutions including 198 Visa 
accounts. Visa provided the necessary 
evidence and law enforcement arrested 
the vendor, and he is currently in custody 
waiting for his trial. The cooperation 
between the Hungarian Police and Visa 
resulted in the saving of €227 286 of 
potential fraud losses. 
E-commerce/digital skimming a low risk 
and high-value modus operandi
The compromise of card data through e-skimming 
(also referred to as digital skimming) has increased, 
with technically knowledgeable organised criminal 
groups targeting e-commerce merchants with weak 
security measures. While sometimes criminals are 
seen targeting bigger companies when they see 
the opportunity, e-skimming mostly affects smaller 
to medium-size merchants, who do not have the 
capabilities to put into place sufficient protection and 
who, as a result, are often compromised without being 
aware of the criminal activity taking place on their 
sites.
In an e-skimming attack, criminals inject malicious 
JavaScript code into the merchants’ checkout 
pages, which allows them to capture personal data 
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Spotlight: FIN6
FIN6 is a prolific group of criminals, 
which has been targeting merchant point 
of sale (POS) systems to gather payment 
account data. In 2019, they expanded 
their attacks to e-commerce merchants, 
which represents a merger between CNP 
fraud and e-commerce breaches. The 
attackers injected malicious code into 
the merchant’s websites, which would 
gather payment account number inputs 
and gather these account numbers into 
an attacker-controlled C2 server. Other 
skimmers have been observed gathering 
more input data than payment account 
numbers, which puts users’ data at risk.
Spotlight: Pipka 
Pipka is a new form of JavaScript 
skimmer which allows cybercriminals 
to configure which form fields the 
programme will parse and extract, 
including payment account numbers, 
expiration data, card verification values 
and the payment cardholder’s name 
and address. Pipka has the added 
feature of being able to remove its 
malicious JavaScript component from 
the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) 
code after successful execution. This 
is a new development in JavaScript 
skimming, and it adds interesting 
new layers to the malware. The Pipka 
skimmer reflects advancements made 
in e-skimming, and it goes to show 
that criminals targeting e-commerce 
will continue to develop innovative 
approaches to gather sensitive payment 
account data.
and credit card credentials. The malicious code 
typically checks the various customer and payment 
account number inputs, exfiltrates the data to an 
attacker-controlled C&C server, following which 
criminals can use this information to commit other 
crimes. Criminals commonly exploit for example 
improperly configured cloud data repositories, 
occasionally utilising automated processes to 
target vulnerabilities. Other entry points that 
criminals have increasingly been targeting include 
e-commerce merchants directly, or their service 
providers, which are supplying solutions ranging 
from analytics and advertisements to other general 
IT services.
The most common type of e-skimming activity, 
which interviewees mentioned, relates to the use of 
Magecart malware by organised criminal groups. 
This type of digital skimming has proven to be so 
lucrative that many established cybercriminals 
have moved into conducting such attacks, with 
JavaScript-based skimming now considered one of 
the main threats to financial institutions.
Private sector respondents have seen different 
variants of point of sale (POS) malware, including 
PwnPOS, AlinaPOS, and POSeidon / Backoff. FIN7 
and FIN8 have been active threat actors in this 
area. FIN8 has also been observed using new 
malware toolsets to target POS environments.
As with other cybercrime areas, e-skimming, too, 
has seen criminals coming up with novel technical 
ways to execute their attacks, such as the Pipka 
malware.
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Darkweb marketplaces enable increase of 
e-skimming
Dedicated forums give cybercriminals the possibility 
to offload their stolen credit card data in a relatively 
low risk and efficient way. The forums also provide 
user-friendly interfaces for fraudsters seeking to 
buy them. At the same time, CaaS has created a 
competition between various underground forums, 
where cybercriminals are offering their sniffers and 
skimmers with constantly improved capabilities. 
E-skimming poses a significant challenge 
to law enforcement and industry
While it is an increasing threat causing significant 
losses, detection of e-skimming is often difficult. 
Merchants do not necessarily realise that they have 
been infected, as it is the card-issuing banks that 
notice the frauds first. Reporting back to the merchant 
does not always take place, especially if the bank 
and the merchant are in different countries, in which 
case it can be difficult to determine who is liable for 
covering the losses: the bank or the merchant. In 
addition to the difficulty of timely detection, there are 
currently no anticipated technological or legal drivers 
to deter criminal groups conducting Magecart-style 
attacks, which is likely going to lead to a further 
increase in these types of attacks. 
Digital fingerprints for sale
Continuing innovative developments of recent years, 
criminals are offering full digital user profiles in 
order to bypass advanced fraud prevention tools. In 
keeping up with e-commerce merchants increasingly 
employing analytics checking a user’s identity 
against device fingerprints and several other metrics, 
criminals have moved to obtaining and selling these 
digital profiles to commit fraud. Taken from machines 
compromised in a botnet, they are used in order to 
make purchases using the compromised computer 
pretending to be a returning customer, using the 
same browser settings and victim’s card credentials. 
After the fraud, many victims erase the evidence 
themselves, following Windows security guidance to 
restore to the last known configuration after having 
been compromised by the botnet, effectively removing 
all traces of the intrusion. This use of botnets to 
bypass sophisticated fraud prevention tools reflects a 
recurrent theme in the fight against cybercrime – as 
security measures are heightened, criminals come up 
with novel ways to continue their illicit activities.
Logical attacks on ATMs and POS devices remain 
a threat and have increased across most Member 
States.  Among these, especially black-box attacks 
have proven popular, as organised criminal groups 
successfully manage to extract large amounts of 
cash in short periods of time. Black-boxing involves 
the installation of an external device connected to the 
cash dispenser in order to bypass the need for a card 
authorisation to dispense cash. Typically, the actual 
installation of the black box requires little technical 
knowledge besides the provision of the device and 
instructions. With cybercriminals remotely sending 
instructions to jackpot the ATMs, itinerant criminal 
networks are able to operate across several locations 
in different countries within a few days, requiring 
quick law enforcement response and international 
cooperation in order to stop them. These criminal 
groups are often Russian-speaking and with links 
to Eastern Europe, actively targeting ATMs across 
Europe. 
Criminals are targeting mostly older ATM models, for 
which security measures and software have not been 
updated. While the modi operandi here remain largely 
the same; with occasional developments taking place 
in accordance with improved ATM security measures, 
law enforcement agencies noticed some changes in 
modi operandi over the past twelve months. As such, 
one Member State respondent saw a particularly 
ingenious criminal group using a new type of modus 
operandi for each attack, including a malware to check 
the balance of an ATM before deciding to attack it.
4.6 TERMINAL ATTACKS INCREASE AS POPULARITY  
OF BLACK-BOX ATTACKS SOARS
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 KEY FINDINGS
 • The Darkweb environment 
has remained volatile, 
lifecycles of Darkweb 
market places have 
shortened, and no clear 
dominant market has 
risen over the past year 
compared to previous 
years to fill the vacuum left 
by the 2019 takedowns. 
 
 • The nature of the 
Darkweb community at 
the administrator level 
shows how adaptive 
it is under challenging 
times, including more 
effective cooperation 
in the search for better 
security solutions and safe 
Darkweb interaction.
 • There has been an increase 
in the use of privacy-
enhanced cryptocurrencies 
and an emergence of 
privacy-enhanced coinjoin 
concepts, such as Wasabi 
and Samurai.
 • Surface web e-commerce 
sites and encrypted 
communication platforms 
offer an additional 
dimension to Darkweb 
trading to enhance the 
overall business model.  
The criminal abuse of 
the darkweb5  C R I M E  P R I O R I T Y 
In 2019 and early 2020 a high level of 
volatility on the Darkweb was witnessed. 
Following protective measures, which multiple 
marketplaces have implemented, the situation 
has calmed down considerably. Nevertheless, 
the Darkweb environment remains difficult to 
disrupt as developments are often challenging 
to anticipate. This adds to the law enforcement 
challenges with respect to this growing threat, 
which continues to function as a key facilitator 
for many other forms of crime.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
the CrImInAl Abuse oF the dArKweb _55IOCTA  2020
_56 IOCTA  2020 the CrImInAl Abuse oF the dArKweb
More marketplaces based on purchased scripts have 
launched over the past twelve months, but some 
of these disappeared due to hacking or exit scams. 
The decrease in large-scale marketplaces has led 
to an increase in smaller marketplaces, in some 
cases catering to specific users or needs. Some of 
these markets are growing and as they gain positive 
feedback from users, they are becoming increasingly 
stable. Users are monitoring ratings and usually 
tend to keep to stable markets and vendors with 
high ratings. The market community has engaged 
in new ways of building trust with its users by 
developing cross-cutting solutions on information 
and reliability. A new site called DarkNet Trust has 
emerged which verifies vendors’ reputations by 
searching through usernames and PGP fingerprints 
and it is able to search over ten thousand profiles from 
marketplaces52.  
After the takedown of DeepDotWeb mentioned in 
the IOCTA 201953, centralisation of information on 
Darkweb markets has stabilised and even increased. 
DeepDotWeb was a popular information service 
which made it easier for users to navigate the 
Darkweb ecosystem. Users are now looking to set up 
information hubs to increase user-friendliness in the 
Darkweb environment and sites such as dark.fail and 
darknetlive.com have taken over DeepDotWeb’s role 
as information hubs. Dread, a popular Darkweb forum 
found on The Onion Router (Tor), continues to operate, 
having been around for approximately three years. 
The administrators of Dread additionally produced a 
DDoS protection solution (nicknamed Endgame Filter), 
which is free to use for other marketplaces, therefore 
expanding their role beyond a traditional information 
hub. Developers have also produced a Darkweb search 
engine termed Recon, a service allowing users to 
see what kind of drugs are for sale on the Darkweb, 
what vendors there are and what ratings they have. 
Another example of a Darkweb search engine is Kilos, 
which emerged in November 2019 reportedly as a 
potential follow up of Grams. Grams was a Darkweb 
search engine which ceased operations in 201754.  
Since going online Kilos seems to have adopted the 
objective of indexing more platforms and adding 
more search functionalities than Grams. Moreover, 
Digital Shadows describes how “Kilos has introduced 
updates, new features, and services that aim to ensure 
security and anonymity for its users and also add a 
more human element to the site not previously seen 
on other prominent Darkweb-based search engines."55
Even though marketplaces continue to appear and 
disappear, an increasing number of operationally 
secure marketplaces, such as wallet-less and user-
less markets, have emerged. Additionally, some 
marketplaces have intentionally relatively short 
lifecycles, which pose a challenge to law enforcement 
investigations. Short life cycles are making it difficult 
for law enforcement to investigate criminal cases. 
Administrators seem to want to stay under the radar 
of law enforcement by knocking down markets and 
keeping market lifecycles low.
5.2 MARKETPLACE DEVELOPMENTS
_57IOCTA  2020the CrImInAl Abuse oF the dArKweb
Furthermore, Darkweb administrators have been 
observed pulling together and showing a collaborative 
spirit to maintain the environment under challenging 
circumstances. When faced with similar challenges, 
forum and service administrators have been seen 
working more closely together over sharing code and 
security methodologies (i.e. anti-DDoS measures, 
avoiding scams, creating trust-building sites to help 
users navigate vendors across different marketplaces, 
etc.). The Darkweb is essentially shaping into a 
‘business sector’ in itself. There are also differences 
in the way administrators conduct their business on 
the Darkweb. Some are presenting to have a moral 
compass, banning items relating to the COVID-19 
pandemic crisis, for example. This is not typical 
across the Darkweb, but it is an indication that some 
administrators differ in their approaches to conducting 
illicit trade. 
Administrators are also looking to upgrade their 
security apparatus with other new features. Some 
marketplaces are already shifting to wallet-less and 
user-less markets, adopting multi signatures on 
Bitcoin and Monero, lacking registration requirements 
and enacting no JavaScript policies. Monopoly is also 
a wallet-less market in which payment occurs directly 
between buyer and vendor, and instead of enacting 
transaction fees, the market receives a monthly 
commission. Marketplaces were observed using multi 
signature wallets in their transactions56.  
Users have also opted to use safer communications 
methods. The reputation of Protonmail, an encrypted 
email service considered to be a former favourite 
among Darkweb users57, has suffered after 
accusations that it has been helping law enforcement. 
Due to this, Darkweb users are shifting to new 
emerging encrypted email services such as Sonar and 
Elude58.  
In addition to encrypted email services, Darkweb 
users are relying increasingly on popular digital 
communication channels such as Discord, Wickr and 
Telegram. As these offer some degree of anonymity 
to the users, criminals consider it a safe place. This 
has introduced new initiatives, such as the Telegram 
vending service bot. 
5.3 ADMINISTRATORS AND USERS ADAPT AS THEY AIM  
TO ENHANCE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE
Darkweb child abuse: administrator 
of Darkscandals arrested in the 
Netherlands
Early in March 2020, Europol announced 
the successful takedown of DarkScandals, 
a website which hosted videos of non-
consensual and violent sex videos, including 
elements of rape, torture, human trafficking 
and CSE. The website had claimed it hosted 
thousands of videos of this kind of footage 
from all around the world. The Dutch law 
enforcement authorities and national 
prosecutor’s office cooperated with German 
authorities, US law enforcement authorities 
and US Department of Justice and Europol in 
an operation to arrest the administrator and 
takedown the DarkScandals website. The 
administrator, a Dutch national, had allegedly 
received over 2 million dollars in exchange 
for selling the content on the website. The 
offender was charged with several counts 
of distribution of CSAM, production and 
transportation of obscene matters for sale 
or distribution, engaging in the business or 
selling or transferring obscene matter, and 
laundering of money instruments59.
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In terms of the Darkweb infrastructure, Tor remains 
the preferred option. As a result, criminal usage of 
Tor continues to be the primary focus. However, 
criminals have started to use other privacy-focused, 
decentralised marketplace platforms, such as 
OpenBazaar and Particl.io to sell their illegal goods. 
The emergence of decentralised privacy-oriented 
platforms is not a new phenomenon in the Darkweb 
ecosystem but they have started to increase 
interest over the last year. OpenBazaar in particular 
is noteworthy as certain high priority threats have 
emerged on the platform over the past year. These 
include those banned by some of the other Tor 
market-based administrators such as weapons 
and fentanyl. Even though the numbers may be 
considered limited, the nature of these items means 
the focus ought to be on impact rather than volume. 
COVID-19 related items also emerged on OpenBazaar 
during the pandemic. OpenBazaar has advertised a 
mobile platform Haven and has seen thousands of 
downloads on Android60.
With respect to cryptocurrency on the Darkweb, 
privacy-enhanced wallet services using coinjoin 
concepts (for example Wasabi and Samurai wallets) 
have emerged as a top threat in addition to well 
established centralised mixers. Apart from expected 
functionality including advanced decentralised coin 
mixing or integration of Tor these offer additional 
features. Samurai, for example, offers remote wipe 
SMS commands when under distress. These wallets 
do not necessarily remove the link between the origin 
and destination of the funds but certainly make 
cryptocurrency tracing much more challenging. Some 
administrators of underground markets are trying to 
apply these wallets to their payment systems. Threat 
actors have also been witnessed increasingly using 
hardware wallets, a separate physical device, which 
securely store seeds and private keys for a wide range 
of cryptocurrencies.
Initially, Darkweb markets relied solely on Bitcoin. 
However, over the past few years this has changed. 
An increasing number of markets are recognising 
the benefits of offering multiple coin alternatives, 
including Litecoin, Ethereum, Monero, Zcash, 
and Dash. While Bitcoin still remains the most 
popular payment method (mainly due to its wide 
adoption, reputation and ease of use), the use of 
privacy-enhanced cryptocurrencies has somewhat 
increased albeit not at the rate expected by their 
proponents. Monero is gradually becoming the most 
established privacy coin for Darkweb transactions, 
followed by Zcash and Dash. All these privacy 
coins may present a considerable obstacle to law 
enforcement investigations, despite the competing 
altcoin communities uncritically favouring their 
implementation over the others.
5.4 INFRASTRUCTURE PREFERENCES REMAIN STABLE,  
BUT CRIMINALS DO USE ALTERNATIVES
5.5 PRIVACY ENHANCING WALLETS EMERGE AS A TOP THREAT, AS 
PRIVACY ENHANCING COINS GAIN POPULARITY
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Some platforms existing on the clear web (or surface 
web) are also catering Darkweb goods and services, 
which offers additional benefits for criminals’ business 
models. A number of cybercriminals are relying on 
surface-level e-commerce platforms for increased 
visibility, posting links to their online digital goods 
stores. One case involved an e-commerce platform 
registered to a company based in the Middle East, 
hosting online stores selling malicious digital tools 
from Arabic, Russian, and English language-based 
underground forums (links were found to underground 
forum administrators including cracked.to and nulled.
to). Stores on the platform also offered stolen accounts, 
databases, carding, crypters, banking malware, 
ransomware and variants of the Mirai botnet. This 
platform allowed sellers to accept payments through 
PayPal and cryptocurrencies61. Surface e-commerce 
sites are useful for cybercriminals, as they allow them 
to showcase their products and services and they are 
legitimately registered businesses. Law enforcement 
also found cybercrime tools available on other clear 
web sites. 
5.6 SURFACE WEB PLATFORMS OFFER AN ADDITIONAL 
DIMENSION TO DARKWEB TRADING
There has been an increase in the provision of digital 
and cybercrime elements on the Darkweb. Personal 
data, access to compromised systems (e.g. through 
RDP application), as well as services catering malware, 
ransomware and DDoS attacks, are all elements 
prevalent for the facilitation of cybercrime. Document 
and proof of identity services have also increased on 
the Darkweb. Perpetrators generally use identity and 
document services to support citizenship claims and 
other applications, obtaining lines of credit to set up a 
business, open untraceable bank accounts, proof of 
residence, to commit insurance fraud, purchase illicit 
items and other uses. There has been a shift in the 
offering of legitimate-looking counterfeit passports to 
“legal or registered” passports, which can pass several 
authentication tests, with criminals offering registered 
passport services. Trend Micro Inc. explains that the 
increase of global immigrants and the increasing 
adoption of e-passports is a likely driver behind this 
trend62. Additionally, some Darkweb sites also promote 
money laundering and instructions for users on how to 
use cryptocurrencies for money laundering.
Users can find drug listings in massive volume on the 
Darkweb; however, these do not necessarily reach 
priority-levels in terms of impact. More impactful, 
dangerous drugs, such as fentanyl, opioids and heroin 
are still significantly present on the Darkweb, although 
listings are smaller in number. Europol has observed 
an increasing trend of top organised crime groups 
having a presence on the Darkweb dealing drugs, which 
is likely due to an effort to expand their distribution 
mechanisms. As noted in IOCTA 2019, drug dealers 
may also be running multiple monikers on the Darkweb, 
which makes it difficult to prioritise within the drug topic. 
Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic crisis seemed to 
have the most effect on the supply chains regarding 
drug trade compared to other crime. This has now 
stabilised and the situation has returned to normal, with 
an anticipated growth on the horizon. 
Finally, the distribution of firearms has become 
significantly more fragmented. After the takedown 
of the Berlusconi marketplace by Italian law 
enforcement, which used to be the go-to place for 
firearms on the Darkweb, firearms have emerged on 
different marketplaces.  Firearms are also available 
on OpenBazaar, although the scale of supply is 
unconfirmed. Some shops are also selling firearms 
from the United States. The ability for individuals 
to purchase firearms on the Darkweb has become 
increasingly difficult, due to recent law enforcement 
successes in catching individuals purchasing firearms 
illegally. 
The diverse products and services vary in their level of 
impact and their ability to facilitate more serious forms 
of crime. The supply of these goods on the Darkweb 
poses a significant threat in the EU. Furthermore, the 
geographic nature of the threat is also diversifying. The 
Hydra market – the largest darknet marketplace serving 
Russia and neighbouring countries – has recently 
advertised an impending publication of a new, secure 
encrypted market platform, which they aim to open to 
the English-speaking community. Such a development 
would arguably make Darkweb investigations more 
difficult for law enforcement in the future and poses a 
significant threat to the EU.
5.7 STEADY SUPPLY OF DIVERSE DARKWEB MARKET ITEMS
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Recommendations 
The following section consists 
of highlights from this year’s 
Member State and partner 
interviews combined with 
Europol insights. The majority 
of the responses resonated 
with previously reported 
recommendations focusing on 
recurring themes, such as: 
Coordination and cooperation 
remain critical 
There is little doubt that cybercrime requires more 
effective cooperation between private and public 
sector parties.  Attackers use a coordinated approach 
and share infrastructure, which makes a broad and 
cohesive response to the criminal developments even 
more important. This also requires the engagement 
of multiple levels of collaboration. 
More taskforce-like approaches, which has worked 
especially well in the Netherlands and the UK, would 
be beneficial. Considering the global nature of the 
Darkweb ecosystem and cross-border interaction 
of its users, the key recommendation is to establish 
a dedicated multinational Darkweb task force to 
approach the problem. This would help address 
legal jurisdiction challenges and obstacles hindering 
coordination. 
Pre-investigative actions and information sourcing 
should be enabled with a dedicated centralised 
approach in the EU. This would help identify 
firstly priority cases and criminals, and secondly, 
appropriate jurisdiction over cases and highlight 
the most efficient ways of cooperating over specific 
cases and operations.
There is a persistent need for better cooperation 
with hosting services, social media platforms, and 
ISPs.  Companies need to be more proactive in illegal 
content and activity and blocking it as soon as they 
detect it. One way of improving this is to invest in 
technologies that make sure their platforms are 
clean. They should also be able to demonstrate more 
willingness to assist law enforcement agencies to 
deal with, for example, CSE, and show improved 
openness and transparency. 
» coordination and cooperation; 
» information sharing 
(removing practical obstacles, enhance judicial 
cooperation, reduce time, foster a culture of 
transparency and trust); 
» enhancing the legal framework;
» prevention and awareness;
»  capacity building.
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Information sharing becomes 
even more crucial to offer timely 
response to cybercrime
Efficient and timely information gathering, analysing 
and sharing is crucial for fighting cybercrime. To this 
end, information sharing should be harmonised (what 
information can be shared between parties) and 
institutionalised. Structured efforts need to be put 
into place, increasing trust among the parties sharing 
information. 
We must develop a culture of acceptance and 
transparency, and incentives for victims to bring 
their incidents to light and not fear penalties and re-
victimisation for being targeted by cyber-attacks. 
Considering the fast nature of cybercrime, it is 
important to make the exchange of information in light 
of international cooperation faster by implementing 
channels with, for example, the relevant ISPs at the 
European level (VPN, anonymisers, anonymous email 
providers, cryptocurrency exchanges, etc.).  
 
Enhancing the legal framework 
International law and national legislation should 
be better aligned with investigation practices 
in cybercrime. The link between legislation and 
investigative practices requires more focus. 
There should be more relevant and focused legislation 
addressing bulletproof hosts and registrars, with 
which voluntary cooperation varies with law 
enforcement. 
Darkweb threat actors increasing reliance on 
encrypted email services, privacy-enhanced 
cryptocurrencies and BPH providers pose a 
substantial problem to law enforcement. This calls for 
increased KYC type policies. 
Prevention and awareness as well as 
crisis management 
As indicated in many parts of the IOCTA, criminals remain 
successful because of inadequate cyber hygiene and an 
inability of victims to detect cybercriminal activities. This 
inability often stems from a lack of awareness on the 
side of the victim. This returns in many different forms of 
crime, including social engineering and phishing, as well 
as investment fraud. A lack of knowledge and awareness 
of the risk related to online CSE is also one of the drivers 
behind the increase in online CSAM. This highlights the 
need to continue promoting preventive and educational 
initiatives in a coordinated and structural manner across 
Europe.
In addition to raising awareness, there are calls for more 
effort on improving general cyber preparedness, including 
crisis management, exercises and disaster recovery plans. 
This is a recommendation which Europol in cooperation 
with its partners has responded to through its efforts with 
respect to the Law Enforcement Emergency Response 
Protocol (LE ERP). Developing evaluation schemes to 
assess and test IT security with infrastructure and devices, 
establishing rules and setting guidelines could increase 
resilience against cybercrime. 
 
Capacity building
Cyber elements are becoming more and more visible 
in other areas of criminality and increasing numbers of 
these criminal activities are becoming cyber-enabled. 
This trend requires increased capacity among law 
enforcement to deal with this evolving challenge. 
Integrating cyber elements into law enforcement 
readiness already at the police academy level would 
enable educating and facilitating individuals who want to 
specialise in cybercrime. Effective investigations require 
technical expertise (civilian) and experience in criminal 
cases (law enforcement). Every police force should be 
responsible for developing knowledge within their units. 
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